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MAORI CULTURE AND MODERN ETHNOLOGY: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY, I.

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I.

FEW problems in anthropology can equal in interest and complexity that of the origin and relationships of the Polynesian peoples and of Polynesian culture. Here we find a group of peoples, apparently homogeneous in physical type, language and culture, occupying roughly two million square miles of the earth's surface, but widely scattered over numerous islands within this vast space. Polynesia is a region of great distances and from the days of Captain James Cook European investigators have been amazed that a people, presumably lacking contacts with civilisation could have voyaged and spread so widely over the scattered islands of the Pacific Ocean. So unlikely has this appeared to some that they have suggested that what are now islands were the mountain tops of a continent now sunken, across which the ancestors of the islanders travelled. Apart from the geological difficulties raised by such a view, the people themselves possess a wealth of traditions regarding their origin and migrations which comparative study has verified sufficiently to leave little room for doubting that, as one authority (and one of their own race) has put it, "they were daring canoemen and not pedestrians!" But, granting this, the problem of the peopling of Polynesia and of the origin and history of Polynesian culture is still far from being solved, though there are many theories. Careful studies have been made and are now being made of single localities, and these will provide valuable material for a comparative survey. So far, however, most of the comparative studies suffer from being based upon a single class of evidence, such as language, or traditions or physical type, and none of them can be regarded as wholly satisfactory. As investigation proceeds the problem grows in

complexity. The craniological studies of Dixon, Sullivan and others have made it clear that the Polynesians are not a pure race, but a mixed group made up of three or four stocks which can now be distinguished as occurring to a varying degree in different groups of islands. Further, Polynesian culture now appears to be not simple but complex, and the diversities which exist in it do not seem to be attributable merely to differences in environment but must be explained by processes of blending and modification of diverse cultures. And not only is it complex; there are also in Polynesian culture many evidences of the extensive degeneration and loss of cultural elements. Rivers and Perry have shown that it contains many relics of the archaic civilisation which came originally out of Egypt. Rivers has also given good reasons for doubting that the peopling of Polynesia has taken place in comparatively recent times. Thus the beliefs of earlier investigators in the homogeneity of the Polynesians and their culture and their comparatively recent arrival in their present home are now being abandoned.

But if the Polynesian problem in general is a complex one, the problem of the Maori of New Zealand is even more complex. Early European visitors to New Zealand found in these islands a people speaking a dialect of the far-spread Polynesian tongue and obviously related to the inhabitants of other island groups. They possessed much-valued traditions of their migration to New Zealand in canoes and of their settlement throughout the country. They were a people of such interest, possessing such highly developed arts and crafts that before the end of the eighteenth century there was collected and published a certain amount of data concerning Maori ethnography which had been gathered by early voyagers. In the first half of the nineteenth century, before European influence on the Maori was very extensive, ethnographical investigation of a general nature was carried on by several European residents of New Zealand and this early work culminated in Sir George Grey's "Polynesian Mythology," Dr. A. S. Thomson's "Story of New Zealand," Rev. R. Taylor's "*Te Ika a Maui*," Rev. W. Colenso's "On the Maori Races of New Zealand," and other publications. With the founding of the Polynesian Society in 1892 a period of more systematic investigation began and much new material has been brought to light. In particular the teachings of the *Whare Wananga*, or sacred school of learning, relating to ritual, beliefs, myths and traditions has been recorded. This knowledge was possessed only by a small class in the Maori community and was carefully transmitted to selected pupils. Earlier investigators, and particularly those who were missionaries, did not have access to it. The Polynesian Society, founded through the

efforts of the late S. Percy Smith, has done valuable work in collecting the fast-disappearing memories of original customs and beliefs. The investigations of Edward Tregear and of Elsdon Best are outstanding. Through the study of genealogies and traditions Percy Smith endeavoured to establish a chronology of Polynesian movements in general and in particular of the Maori migrations to New Zealand. He believed that the great migration from "*Hawaiki*" of which the traditions told took place some twenty-one or twenty-two generations back from 1900, or about 1350, the point of departure being Tahiti in the Society group. He also recorded traditions of earlier migrations which have since been amplified. As a result of Percy Smith's work it has been widely believed that New Zealand has been extensively occupied only for some seven centuries. There is now however an increasing wealth of evidence that the country has been occupied from times far earlier than the "*Hawaiki*" traditions appear to state. There are many traces of ancient occupation, terraced hill forts for example, in which are huge trees requiring centuries for growth, concerning which there are no traditions. Opinion is consequently returning to the view held in the nineteenth century by Colenso, Grey, Maning, von Haast and others, that if subsequent migrations took place as traditions relate there was already a large population in the country. Further, when Maori culture is compared with that of the rest of Polynesia, it at once becomes evident that there are important divergencies. Some modifications are doubtless due to the changed environment. The climate and natural resources of New Zealand necessitated various changes in the habits of settlers from central Polynesia. But other differences are not to be explained in this way. The distinctive character of Maori decorative art is especially outstanding. The decorative art of Polynesia is predominantly rectilinear and makes very little use of the human figure. Maori art is curvilinear, the spiral being particularly developed; and it uses the human form freely. Evidence is also accumulating regarding customs, arts and implements which cannot be traced to central Polynesia but which appear to bear relationships to forms of culture found elsewhere, outside Polynesia.

The problem of the origin and relationships of Maori culture is thus far from being solved. But it does seem likely that fresh light may be thrown upon it by some of the newer ethnological conceptions and theories. New Zealand investigators have been so rightly concerned to place on record all those memories of the original culture which can be gathered from the older natives that they have had little time to devote to wider ethnological theories and their applica-

tions. This is work for the future. What is attempted here is a brief statement of some modern ethnological concepts and theories, and some suggestions as to their possible bearings on the problem of Maori culture.

II.

Something like a revolution is at present going on in the field of cultural anthropology. New conceptions have been introduced which differ radically from those of the orthodox anthropology of the past and naturally they are not making their way without opposition from adherents of the older views. It is usual to summarise this conflict by saying that it is between the theory of the independent origin of the forms of human culture, associated with the names of Bastian and Tylor, and the theory of diffusion, associated in England with the names of Rivers, Elliot Smith and Perry. From another point of view it is the conflict between an "evolutionary" and an "historical" interpretation of culture. But a fuller statement of the issue is necessary if these terms are to be understood, and the history of ethnology provides the best means of approach. In the days before the theory of evolution was advanced the ethnological problem was a simple one. "So long," says Rivers, "as it was universally believed that man came into existence by a special act of creation, and owed his diversity of speech and custom to the miracle of Babel, there was little scope for a science of ethnology. It was generally held in the past that the more backward peoples of the earth, or rather those whom we regard as backward because they are different from ourselves, were so because they had degenerated from the state in which they were created." Similarities in the forms of human culture were held to be intelligible as the result of the original dispersal of the members of the human race. In particular there was a widespread belief in the influence of the lost Ten Tribes of Israel, a belief which has fascinated certain minds to this day. As knowledge of the races and customs of mankind increased many books were written to demonstrate this influence. It is interesting to note this fact here since one of the early students of the Maori, Rev. R. Taylor, was much impressed by it as his "*Te Ika a Maui*" (1870) shows. The triumphant refutation by the evolutionists of the claims of the theologians was not without unfortunate results for ethnology. It resulted in the important notions of the diffusion and degeneration of culture falling into the background to be revived only in the last few years. But the theory of evolution, or rather the early misconception of it by ethnologists, which was one of many such misconceptions, had other important consequences. It is here

that the influential theories of Bastian and Tylor take their rise. Adolf Bastian claimed that the forms of human culture were independently evolved and that where similarities existed between them these were to be explained as due to uniformity of the constitution and operations of the human mind. Bastian used the term "Elemantargedanke" to cover those psychological characteristics, the existence of which has enabled this independent evolution of similar forms to take place. But as Elliot Smith has recently shown, this use of the conception of evolution is a misleading one and, in fact, a reversal of what the biologist means by evolution. In discussing this development of ethnological theory he writes: "The ethnologists who began to apply biological terms in their speculations fifty years ago did not take the trouble to use them correctly. They used the term evolution, not in the biological sense as the derivation of a series of different organisms from a common ancestry, but for a speculation that is the very antithesis of the meaning associated with the word by the zoologist and botanist. It was employed by the ethnologist to express the idea of independence of origin, the growth of analogous customs and beliefs without any community of origin or genetic relationships of any sort the one with the other. In other words, the meaning the ethnologist meant to convey by the word evolution is what the biologist refers to as 'the claim for spontaneous generation.'" Tylor adopted the conceptions of "psychic unity" and "independent evolution" from Bastian and since at the time the theory of evolution was making its way and being widely applied and generally adopted, this theory became dominant in ethnology. In the article "Anthropology" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th edition, Tylor wrote: "Anthropological researches undertaken all over the globe have shown the necessity of abandoning the old theory that a similarity of customs and superstitions, of arts and crafts, justifies the assumption of a remote relationship, if not identity of origin, between races. It is now certain that there has ever been an inherent tendency in man, allowing for difference of climate and material surroundings, to develop culture by the same stages and in the same way. American man, for example, need not necessarily owe the minutest portion of his mental, religious, social or industrial development to remote contact with Asia and Europe, though he were proved to possess identical usages." As regards the evolution of institutions Tylor held that they follow one another "in a series substantially uniform over the globe." This statement has been clearly disproved by the facts of anthropology and formulæ of sequence in a unilinear series are now being abandoned. The doctrine of "psychic unity" also, as understood by these writers, is seen on examination

in the light of modern psychology, to be untenable. With the abandoning of an unreal type of individual psychology, many mental characteristics, once thought to be part of the inherited constitution of the human mind, are seen to be derived from the social heritage and to pass from mind to mind by the process of social inheritance. The psychologist now sees that he must look more and more to the study of culture to understand his problem of the mind and behaviour of man. "How," asks Rivers, "can you explain the workings of the human mind without a knowledge of the social setting which must have played so great a part in determining the sentiments and opinions of mankind?" It is true that the doctrine of "psychic unity" has received a certain stimulus in recent years from Freud's theory of universal "typical symbols" and Jung's theory of the collective unconscious with its "archetypes of thought." Symbolism is undoubtedly of vast importance in human culture but in the case of neither of these theories can we yet be sure that the symbolism is universal or a matter of individual inheritance. What "psychic unity" can mean, and this meaning is a very significant one, is a broad uniformity of instinctive-emotional endowment in men of all times and places; so that we may look for similar fundamental motives and emotional reactions, the institutions in which these find expression being socially determined. Recent ethnological theories have exemplified in a striking way this community of motives extending back even beyond the early civilisations into prehistoric times. The refusal to accept the doctrine of "psychic unity" does not mean, as has been suggested by some, the neglecting of the psychological factor in ethnology. After arguing against this conception Elliot Smith is able to write: "The causes of the modern actions of mankind are deeply rooted in the past. But the spirit of Man has ever been the same; and the course of ancient history can only be properly appreciated when it is realised that the same human motives whose nature can be studied in our fellow men today actuated the man of old also."

One reaction from the "evolutionary" theory of culture developed in Germany. It was initiated by Ratzel who in his "Early History of Mankind" maintained that similarities of culture are due to transmission from a centre of origin. His work was followed up by Graebner, Ankermann and Schmidt and the latest expression of the views of this school is contained in Schmidt and Koppers's recent "*Völker und Kulturen*" which traces the spread and interaction of a series of fundamental "*Kulturkreisen*." More important from the present point of view is the "historical" school which has grown up in England and which is associated with the names of

Elliot Smith, Rivers and Perry. The presidential address on "The Ethnological Analysis of Culture" which Rivers delivered before the Anthropology Section of the British Association in 1911 may be looked upon as the first important statement of the new point of view. In this address Rivers announced his change of attitude on ethnological problems and his discarding of the dogma of unilateral evolution. Speaking of the theoretical anthropology of the time he said: "Where similarities are found in different parts of the world, it is assumed, almost as an axiom, that they are due to independent origin and development, and this in its turn is ascribed to the fundamental similarity of the workings of the human mind all over the world, or that, given similar conditions, similar customs and institutions will come into existence and develop on the same lines." Rivers had accepted this dogma blindly, but his field-work in Melanesia had convinced him that it was false. He therefore rejected the view that any peoples now existing on the earth are to be regarded as simple representatives of particular stages of human development. The course of this development, he believed, had in all cases been highly complicated, "every existing culture, even when apparently most simple, being the result of the blending of cultures which have been carried over the earth's surface by the movements of migrating peoples." Rivers proceeded to develop the notion of culture-mixture and in an article on "The Contact of Peoples" elucidated the general principle that the "extent of the effect of a migrating people upon those among whom they settle is proportional to the degree of superiority of the immigrant culture, and from this it will follow that the greater the superiority of an introduced culture, the smaller need be the number of its introducers." The contact of peoples is of course not limited to the past and this principle, it was pointed out, applies equally to the present and to the past. Rivers showed that a relatively small body of immigrants could, if their culture was greatly superior, exercise a profound influence upon those among whom they settled. This makes it clear that the diffusion of culture is not to be confused with the migration of population, an important point. In one of his posthumously published volumes, "Medicine, Magic and Religion," Rivers applied his conceptions to particular forms of culture and traced "a highly complex process of interactions between peoples and their cultures, producing blended products, in the case before us, blends of medicine with magic and religion." He also unravelled the modifications, developments and simplification of practices after introduction. But more important than these contributions to anthropology was his paper on "The Disappearance of Useful Arts" now published in "Psychology and Ethnology."

This paper reintroduced the conception of the degeneration and loss of forms of culture which had been neglected with the general acceptance of the theory of evolution. Tylor, for example, in the article already quoted, says: "Had the Australians or New Zealanders, for instance, ever possessed the potter's art, they could hardly have forgotten it." Statements elsewhere make it clear that Tylor recognised the existence of cultural degeneration, and also, as Westermarck and Marett have pointed out, of diffusion, but this was certainly not his main point of view. Rivers was able to show that not only had the potter's art been lost, and lost apparently by the ancestors of the New Zealanders, but that such an important art as boat-building could be lost by an island people. These losses, he showed, were certainly not always due to lack of suitable raw materials or to other utilitarian reasons; social and magico-religious motives were also at work. Rivers had found the same process of degeneration operating on a large scale in his study of medical practices. It would be difficult now to overestimate the importance of this process in the study of human culture. Though local developments of certain forms may subsequently take place the culture of a colony never equals that of the centre of origin. Degeneration of culture after diffusion is unquestionably one of the most illuminating conceptions in the whole of modern ethnology and one which has particular value in the study of Polynesian problems. We now see that there is in man in general no innate tendency towards progress and that his past is far from being a simple upward movement. Degeneration has occurred in all times and places and in connection with all aspects of culture.

About the same time that Rivers was being led to change his point of view in ethnology Elliot Smith was studying certain features of Egyptian culture, especially megalithic monuments and the practice of mummification, which, he had come to believe, had spread from Egypt to many parts of the world. Rivers, on analysing his material from Melanesia had found evidence of a succession of immigrations into that region bearing the practice of preserving the dead in a way similar in many points to that of Egypt and also megalithic architecture. Subsequent investigation by W. J. Perry made it clear that the megalithic culture-complex had been carried from Egypt through Indonesia into the Pacific. Perry was also able to discover the motives which had led to these migrable to discover the motives which had led to these migrations into and subsequently across the Pacific. The driving force was attractive rather than propulsive. The megalithic sites were found to correspond with areas where pearls, gold and other precious substances existed. He therefore suggested that

it was the search for these substances that had led these early voyagers so far; and further that their desire for these objects was not a utilitarian but a magico-religious one. They were in Elliot Smith's terms "life-giving" or "death-averting" substances. The desire for these "givers of life" now appears as one of the main factors in the development and spread of early civilisation. In his "Children of the Sun" Perry has set forth a bold and comprehensive theory of the rise of the archaic civilisation in Egypt about 4000 B.C. and its purposive diffusion throughout a great part of the world, as a result of the search for gold, pearls, jade and other precious, "life-giving" substances. The essential features of the archaic civilisation were agriculture with irrigation, megalithic architecture, metal-working and pottery, the cult of the sun, the practice of mummification and the dual organisation of society. Perry traces the routes by which this civilisation travelled and its modifications and degeneration on the way. To adopt the chronology suggested by Elliot Smith, before 3000 B.C. Egyptian colonies carried its elements to Crete, Syria, Sumer and Elam. Within the next millennium secondary diffusions from these centres carried modified forms of the same culture to new centres in Europe, Africa and Asia, including India. In the next millennium there was a further diffusion into Indo-China, the Malay Archipelago and Melanesia. At about the beginning of the Christian era it reached Polynesia and carried across the Pacific to Peru, Central America and Mexico the germs of their civilisations. The selective agency which had led these ancient migrants to choose certain spots for their colonies was the presence there of gold and other valued substances. Their motives, in other words, were curiously similar to those which in modern times have carried our own civilisation to California, Australia and other places.¹ The cultural elements of the archaic civilisation are especially grouped in places which were important sources of desired raw materials. Whatever modifications may have to be introduced into Perry's daring theory of the rise, spread and decay of ancient culture it stands as one of the most remarkable achievements of modern anthropology. It gives an illuminating vision of the unity of inspiration in civilisation and of continuity in the development and spread of culture.

¹ There is much evidence that the desire for gold took these early colonists to New Guinea where, as Chinnery has shown, there are many remains of early occupation. The same desire has taken white men there within the last year. A report of the Sterling scientific expedition into the interior of Dutch New Guinea gives an interesting minor illustration of processes of diffusion and borrowing in actual operation. Writing of the degraded stage of cultural development of the savages there Dr. Sterling says: "They learned the use of fish-hooks by watching our Dyaks. It was a new idea to them, as heretofore the only method they knew was to shoot the fish with arrows; a tedious business." (*Observer*, London, Dec. 12, 1926.)

Perry's theory as can be seen has important psychological aspects. He says: "In dealing with the problem of the distribution of the various forms of culture, and particularly with the settlements of the archaic civilisation itself, I urge that the important factor is the human mind with its desires and aims. Men in the past have imposed their will on their surroundings and have not been forced by them into any line of action. Given certain desires, men will do their utmost to satisfy them, and it is to this dynamic attitude that is attributed the development and spread of the archaic civilisation." And again on the point of method: "The vicissitudes through which the archaic civilisation has gone may be described in terms both of history and psychology. The historical description must of course come first and in this book (*"The Children of the Sun"*) the great bulk of the attention of the reader is occupied with such problems. But it is impossible to ignore the psychological aspects of the process." In other words Perry's method combines historical reconstruction with psychological analysis. This raises the complex question of the relation of psychology to ethnology and of the validity of psychological interpretations in ethnological inquiry. The fallacious use of the conception of "psychic unity" in ethnology and the new meaning which must be given to this term if it is still to be used has already been mentioned. Equally open to criticism are some of the direct applications of psycho-analysis to ethnological data. As Ernest Jones has shown in his paper "Psycho-Analysis and Anthropology" read before the Royal Anthropological Institute some few years ago, the Freudian theory has much valuable new insight to give to the student of anthropological problems. Psycho-analysis for example bears out and illuminates many of the conceptions developed by Elliot Smith, Rivers and Perry. Malinowski also in his article "The Psychology of Sex in Primitive Society" and his "Sex and Repression in Savage Society" has shown that successful application can be made to anthropology of psycho-analytical conceptions. But the interpreting of anthropological material exclusively in terms of unconscious mental mechanisms to the neglect of historical and sociological considerations, such as one finds in Freud's "Totem and Tabu" and Roheim's "Australian Totemism" is unsatisfactory. One very general psycho-analytical conception is of particular value to the ethnologist in his search for the causes which lead to various forms of social behaviour—that of rationalisation. This is the secondary production of reasons for actions, the real motives of which lie beyond the scope of reason. The ethnologist finds this process existing on an extensive scale and the modern investigator is on his guard against taking at their face value many of the explanations offered him.

Utilitarian explanations of customs, for example, may not be the primary ones but may rest back upon some earlier motives of another sort.

The work of Rivers who was primarily a psychologist shows admirably the right use of psychological interpretation. "For Rivers," says Elliot Smith, "every problem in ethnology was essentially psychological"; he sought for "the psychological motives that impelled men to develop customs and beliefs in articular ways." But just because he was so excellent a psychologist Rivers declined to give those simple and wholesale psychological explanations of social processes without preliminary sociological analysis which some writers have attempted. In his article "Sociology and Psychology" he criticised Westermarck's assumption of the motive of revenge to explain the blood-feud and showed that it was through a detailed study of the social process itself that the emotions concerned were to be understood. "It is only through the study of social processes in general that we can expect to understand the mental states which underlie those processes. . . . In place of asking how can you explain the blood-feud without revenge, I would rather ask how can you explain revenge without a knowledge of the blood-feud?" Rivers saw clearly the important part which institutions play in determining the sentiments and consequently behaviour; and in his later ethnological studies he combined preliminary historical and sociological analysis with the illuminative interpretations drawn, not from a barren individual psychology, but from social psychology.

The ethnological conceptions and theories here briefly outlined have not of course escaped criticism. In particular the exclusively Egyptian origin of civilisation has been criticised by archæologists, and by Lowie and others as implying the complete passivity of all non-Egyptian peoples. There is much to be considered here. Having escaped from a dogma of unilateral evolution the ethnologist must undoubtedly be on his guard against adopting a dogma of unicentral diffusion. This is also said to be a lifeless and inorganic view of culture, treating it, in Malinowski's words, as "a thing which can be preserved in cold storage for centuries, transported across oceans and continents, mechanically taken to pieces and re-compounded." But this is hardly a fair account of what the theory states. "The diffusion of culture," says Perry, "is an organic process. An impulse sets out from a focus. It is carried to another country, perhaps by a few men. There it has its effect perhaps profound, perhaps weak. The original carriers of it may disappear even though their original influence had been immense. The native population takes up the new ideas, amalgamates them with what it already possesses,

and the result is something new, something characteristic of the country. No one would assert for a moment that Indian civilisation had not its definite characteristics, but it would be hazardous to assert that this civilisation had sprung up entirely independently of outside influences. Once a cultural element is in existence it is capable of infinite modifications and when transplanted to a fresh country it can hardly help being altered, and such processes of alteration can be witnessed in all parts of the earth." Malinowski has also criticised this and other ethnological theories for their exclusive concern with the reconstruction of "histories" and their neglect of the important practical questions as to what are the elements of human culture, what are the laws of cultural process and what is the nature of culture in general. We often know the history, he says, but we really do not know of what. Malinowski's interest lies in the functional interpretation of existing cultures. In the case of cultures which have disappeared or almost disappeared it is surely difficult to deny a place to historical reconstruction. Psychological and pragmatic considerations go hand in hand with it.

It is not suggested that the conceptions and theories outlined here are about to solve all the problems of Polynesian and of Maori ethnology; but it is suggested that they offer a new point of view from which these questions may profitably be studied. Rivers has pointed out that an insular area is a particularly favourable one for the application of the theory of diffusion. "An insular region," he says, "and especially one so vast and diversified as that of the islands of Oceania, allows different parts to be affected in very different degrees by any immigrant culture, while the fact that certain islands or groups of islands may wholly escape an incoming influence allows the application of the method of difference in a way which is most exceptional, if it ever occurs, in a continental area." Further, the relative isolation of the constituent parts of an insular area makes it possible to see more clearly how elements of culture may be modified or disappear or result in the appearance of a new form when carried from one site to another. Rivers and Perry have both discussed the influence of the archaic civilisation in Polynesia. Its direct influence in New Zealand, for example, appears to be small although there are many relics and many connections. As Rivers has remarked it certainly adds interest to the study of this area when it is found to contain phases of culture allied to or derived from one of the most wonderful civilisations that the world has ever seen. But apart from this throughout the area there has been diffusion, blending, modification and degeneration. It is the adoption of this point of view which is important. "So long," says Perry, "as anthropologists persist

in the attempts to explain social facts '*in situ*,' without any question as to whether they are in process of elaboration or are simply degraded relics, so long will they be unable to afford any rational explanation of the vast bulk of the facts with which they are confronted. Anthropology will take a great stride forward once students face about and recognise the reality of degradation, of the possession, by a multitude of communities of institutions that they are unable to preserve."

This is the new point of view. Some possible lines of inquiry for further intensive study of the available materials of Maori culture may now be suggested.

(To be concluded.)

FAMILY ENDOWMENT IN NEW SOUTH WALES.

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FROM many points of view the *Family Endowment Act*, No. 39, of 1927, and the *Industrial Arbitration (Declaration of Living Wage) Act*, No. 38, of 1927, which received the Royal assent on 11th April, 1927, together constitute the most important measure in the field of social legislation passed by the New South Wales Legislature in the last thirty years. Not merely for New South Wales but for Australia at large the latter Act marks a new departure in the system of basic-wage determination, in prescribing a man and wife without children as the new domestic unit for which a subordinate authority shall declare a living wage, while the *Family Endowment Act* constitutes—if not actually the first (a modest *Family Allowance Act* having become law in New Zealand in 1926) then certainly the most important measure of its kind to find a place on a British statute book.

As applied in a system of wage determination the domestic unit incorporated in the statutes of 1927 is itself of New South Wales origin, having been first put forward some eight years earlier by the Statist to the New South Wales Board of Trade during the protracted enquiry which preceded the Board's declaration of 8th October, 1919, whereby the living wage for New South Wales was increased, in terms of the cost of living, from £3 to £3 17s. a week. As alternative to a "straight rise" of 17s., the Statist had suggested the determination of a living wage in terms of the needs of man and wife only, supplemented by an endowment for all children of employees and at such a rate as would, for a family of four members, make the total wage up to £3 17s. In order to mitigate the burden imposed upon industry by the flat increase of 17s., the Nationalist Government of the day forthwith introduced in the New South Wales legislature a *Maintenance of Children Bill*, which incorporated the principle of the alternative scheme and was designed to supersede the declaration of 8th October. By the end of November, 1919, the bill had passed the Legislative Assembly and been rejected by the Legislative Council.¹

¹ For details of this scheme see *Family Allowances*, p. 161 (Studies and Reports, Series D. No. 13, of International Labour Office (1924)); and *Family Allowances in Foreign Countries*, p. 119 (Bulletin No. 401 of U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics (1926)); and Report from Select Committee of Legislative Council of N.S.W. on Financial Provisions of Maintenance of Children Bill, Government Printer, Sydney, 1919 (†77455. C82—a).

In the passage of the recent bills through the New South Wales Legislature a deadlock occurred between the two Houses, and was successfully met by the seldom used method of a Free Conference.²

For these reasons an account of the antecedents of the bills and of the Parliamentary proceedings in connection with them may be of general interest.

I.

By the *Industrial Arbitration (Amendment) Act*, No. 14, of 1926, important changes both in machinery and function were made in the New South Wales system of statutory wage regulation as contained in the *Industrial Arbitration Act*, 1912. The jurisdiction and powers of the existing Court of Industrial Arbitration were vested in an Industrial Commission appointed under the Act of 1926, the Judges and additional Judges of the Court ceasing to exercise jurisdiction without ceasing to hold office. Provision was made for the appointment by the Governor of a salaried Industrial Commissioner for five years and for a salaried Deputy Commissioner. Sitting with assessors or, where so authorized by the Act, when sitting alone, the Commissioner was to constitute the Industrial Commission. The Minister was directed to appoint, subject to the Act, as assessors in any particular matter an even number of persons to sit with the Commissioner, one-half representing employers and one-half employees, two-thirds of the members to form a quorum. Decisions of the Commission were to be made by a majority and, where the numbers were equally divided, the opinion of the Commissioner was to prevail. In effect, therefore, the salaried Commissioner was to be the Commission. To this office the Labour Government appointed Mr. A. B. Piddington, K.C.³

² The Second Chamber Conference (1918) (Lord Bryce Chairman) had recommended this method of solving Parliamentary deadlocks (1918, cmd. 9038, cf. Anson: *Law and Custom of Parliament*, I, p. 308).

³ Mr. Piddington had devoted much study to the question of Family Endowment. His well-known pamphlet, *The Next Step* (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1921), was the fruits of his experience as Chairman of the Federal Basic Wage Commission.

It is worth mentioning that it was shortly after the failure of the N.S.W. Maintenance of Children Bill that Mr. W. M. Hughes (Prime Minister of Australia) appointed in December, 1919, the Federal Basic Wage Commission of seven members (Mr. A. B. Piddington, K.C., Chairman), charged with reporting on:

- (a) The actual cost of living . . . according to reasonable standards of comfort . . . for a man, wife, and three children under 14, and on an itemized statement of such cost.
- (b) The corresponding cost of living during each of the last five years.
- (c) A method of automatically adjusting the basic wage to fluctuations in the purchasing power of the sovereign.

The Commission having unanimously reported on the 19th November, 1920, that the cost of living as at 1st November was £5 16s., and the Commonwealth Statistician having thereafter reported—in reply to an enquiry from

Among the wide powers conferred on the Commission by Section 7 of the Act there figured the following provision, which is believed to be unique in British legislation:

The powers and function of the Commission shall include the following:

Subsection 1 (b).—Not more frequently than once in every 6 months to determine a standard of living, and to declare what shall for the purposes of this Act and of the Principal Act be the living wages based upon such standard for adult male and adult female employees in the State.

The Commission may declare what deductions may be made from such wages for board or residence, or for board and residence, and for any customary privileges or payments in kind conceded to or made to such employees.

This section repeals and takes the place of Section 79 (1) of the principal *Arbitration Act*, No. 16, of 1918, under which it was the duty of the Board of Trade "from year to year after public enquiry as to the increase or decrease in the average cost of living to declare what shall be the living wages to be paid to adult male employees and adult female employees in the State or any part thereof." The Board of Trade, moreover, was empowered to make regional determinations and, until 1921, to declare a separate basic wage for rural industries, but not expressly to determine a standard of living, although some standard of living was necessarily implied in any basic wage declaration.

Without condescending upon the principles to be applied, Parliament, by the new section, cast upon a subordinate authority—the Industrial Commission—an unfettered discretion to determine "a standard of living" but not oftener than once in six months, and thereafter to declare, in terms of such standard, living wages for adult male and adult female employees without differentiating either between different parts of the State or between rural and urban industries.

A specific statutory mandate to determine "a standard of living" was no doubt correctly termed in the Commissioner's

the Prime Minister—that payment of a basic wage of this amount to all adult male employees in Australia was impossible because the whole produced wealth of the country, including profits, would not, if divided up equally among all employees, yield the necessary weekly amount. Mr. Piddington, in a supplementary report to the Prime Minister, recommended a basic wage of £4 for man and wife, and an endowment of 12s. for dependent children.

By *Statutory Rules*, 1920, Nos. 263 and 266, the Federal Government, as an act of policy, provided an endowment of £13 for the children of officials in the Federal Service receiving less than £500 (see *Federal Hansard*, 1927, No. 5, pp. 452-5).

In 1926 the Queensland Government had appointed Mr. Piddington Chairman of a Committee to report upon the finances of a child endowment scheme.

The N.S.W. Act of 1926 provided also for the appointment of Conciliation Committees to be presided over by seven salaried chairmen; 230 committees were constituted (see *N.S.W. Industrial Gazette*, XXX, No. 4, Special Supplement, 1926).

judgment a new departure in the Australasian system of wage regulation, yet in entrusting the execution of the new duty to the discretion of a non-parliamentary body, the New South Wales Legislature had but once more shirked the duty of making up its own mind as to the domestic unit for which the standard was to be determined. As in all the earlier cases of Parliamentary intervention, the wage-determining authority was left either to take over ready-made a standard found by yet another authority or to assume some standard without Parliamentary guidance. Thus it was Mr. Justice Higgins who laid down for the Federal Arbitration Court in 1907 in the *Harvester Case* (2 Commonwealth Arbitration Reports, 1) its present unit of the five-member family, which was afterwards adopted by statute in Queensland, and prevails also in the State tribunals of South Australia and Tasmania. On the other hand, it was Mr. Justice Heydon in the New South Wales Industrial Arbitration Court who adopted the unit of the four-member family, which has also been adopted by the West Australian Court in the interpretation of its statutory duty to have regard "to the average domestic obligations of the worker." Not the least merit of the Legislative Council's action on the two Government measures in question lies precisely in the fact that the New South Wales Legislature was thereby compelled to face and solve for itself this long-neglected problem.

The Commission, which in dealing with this important matter of the standard of living consisted of the Industrial Commissioner and eight assessors,⁴ conducted an enquiry extending over six months, at which organizations of employers and labour were represented by counsel. Argument was heard on the question whether the Commission should base its standard of living on the needs of a four-unit or of a five-unit family. The 1920 schedule for food and miscellaneous items having been accepted and brought up to date, evidence was heard at length as to the clothing and rent elements. The members of the Commission representing employees and labour having differed in opinion, as might have been expected, the judgment of Mr. Piddington, the Industrial Commissioner, dated 15th December, 1926, became the judgment of the Commission.

Under Section 7 (6) of the Act the Commission had, it will be remembered, the double task (a) of determining "a standard of living" and (b) of declaring the living wage,

⁴ Miss E. Still, Miss V. Meagher and Messrs. R. K. Allport and K. A. Goodland representative of employers; Messrs. T. P. Holloway, Peter Conolly, Mrs. C. W. Dwyer, Miss I. Cashman representative of employees.

based upon such standard, for adult male employees and adult female employees in the State.

As to (a) Mr. Piddington, adopting the basis of a five-unit family, determined "a standard of living" which, when converted into a weekly wage in terms of the present cost of the 1920 list of itemized elements of necessary expenditure and of a raised "rent element" amounts to £5 6s. for the metropolitan area.

As to (b) he made no alteration of the existing basic wage of £4 4s., "which will, as it happens (he said) provide the standard of living for a man, wife and one child," but he coupled this declaration with a recorded decision that early legislation by the State Parliament was imperative to secure family allowances in order to secure the new standard of living. He suggested payment to mothers of 6s. per week for each child under 14 years of age, as well as means of financing the endowment, *viz.*, a levy on employers in respect of wages bill and by a contribution from the Treasury.

Except in its suggestion as to finance little criticism has been passed upon the able judgment of Mr. Piddington, which is especially valuable for its demonstration of the injustice to workers and employers alike of fixing a flat-rate basic-wage which by common consent secures more than the standard for the unmarried worker or childless couple, and less than the standard for the married worker with more children than the two assumed by the old Board of Trade to constitute the standard family. A brief summary may be useful.

II.

THE JUDGMENT OF 15TH DECEMBER, 1926.

The difficulty of determining "a standard of living" for a population of over two and a quarter millions, Mr. Piddington, it is conceived, passes over perhaps too lightly, since, despite obvious points of difference, he uses to illustrate the Commission's problem the analogy of the task undertaken by an Equity Judge when determining the amount for maintenance of a ward of the Court "according to his station in life" or by a Commissariat staff in determining "the food, the clothing, the equipment and the meagre comforts of a soldier" in training or on active service. In truth and in fact the Commission's function was nothing short of delegated legislation, and but for the fortunate circumstance that the report prepared by Mr. Piddington himself as Chairman of the Federal Basic Wage Commission of 1920 had given full particulars of the

cost of living "according to reasonable standards of comfort" for "a man with a wife and three children under 14" its labours might have been indefinitely prolonged and its determination capricious. The parties before the Industrial Commission accepted the Report of 1920 as a working basis of investigation, its conclusion not being invalidated by its assumption of a five-unit family since (as the Judgment puts it, page 3) :

"a standard of living once ascertained for a domestic unit or family of one structure can be converted into the cost necessary for any other domestic unit."

Moreover it was clearly understood—

"that the five-in-family unit should be the subject of evidence as to the requisite standard of living, but that nothing was to be assumed as to the unit to be taken when it came to declare the living wage."

The finding of 1920 consisted of four sections: i, rent (or the cost of housing); ii, clothing; iii, food; iv, miscellaneous requirements (mostly miscellaneous).

The items in Section II and IV having been accepted by the parties before the Commission as approximately satisfactory, the cost of these two items in terms of recent purchasing power of money was found by the judgment to be: food £2 0s. 2d. and miscellaneous 17s. 10d., while rent and clothing were found to cost £1 8s. and £1 respectively, the total for a five-in-family unit being thus £5 6s. per week.

For the purposes of declaring a living wage measured by this standard, the domestic unit to be adopted became a question of crucial importance, more particularly if a uniform or flat-rate wage were to be laid down. This question the New South Wales Act had left entirely open. If now the actual average number of children per male adult employee (married and unmarried), which in fact is less than one, were to be taken, the domestic unit under a flat-rate system ought to be a man, wife and one child. On the other hand, "it was impossible to satisfy human needs by giving each family the average of all" and the dispute as to relative merits of family units became a question of manœuvring for position as between employer and employee. The Judgment showed convincingly the injustice of the flat-rate system. With a living wage for adult males declared upon the new standard of living in respect of a hypothetical domestic unit of five persons, employers would be paying for at least 1,200,000 non-existent children (page 7). While 38,000 male adults with more than three children would be "cast out of their social rights." For the children of these—to the number of 183,000—the living wage would make no provision. With a domestic unit includ-

ing two instead of three children, "the injustice to employers is diminished by increasing the injustice to employees." 498,000 non-existent children would be paid for out of the "margin of skill" over and above the basic wage in the father's remuneration. But the Judgment expressed the opinion that such margin, which had remained practically stationary during the last 20 years despite an approximately 49% drop in the purchasing power of money, ought not to be taken into account as tempering the injustice of the flat-rate basic wage.⁵ For the employer in paying for non-existent children there was no such tempering of the injustice of the flat-rate compulsory wage.

After referring to the scope of family endowment schemes adopted in foreign countries, illustrating by quotations the incapacity of arbitration authorities in Australia and New Zealand to adopt any juster system than that of a flat-rate wage, and citing the approval given by all political parties in Australia to the principle of family endowment, the Judgment continued:

The only thing to be done, therefore, is to regard the present position as transitional and to declare the living wage now at its present figure £4 4s., *which will, as it happens, provide the standard of living for a man, wife and one child* (the approximate average of children per adult male) and to couple with this declaration a recorded decision that early legislation by the State Parliament is imperative to secure family allowances (page 12).

While not suggesting that 6s. per week was sufficient for the full support of a child, the Judgment used this amount in

TABLE OF FAMILY BASIC INCOME.

Uniform living wage paid by employer to all adult male employees, single or married, with children or without.	Addition of motherhood endowment paid by Treasury to mothers.	Resultant family basic income, consisting of (1) living wage paid to adult male by employer; (2) motherhood endowment paid to mothers by Treasury.
£ s. d.	s. d.	£ s. d.
4 4 0	Family with 1 child 6 0	4 10 0
	Family with 2 children 12 0	4 16 0
	Family with 3 children 18 0	5 2 0
	Family with 4 children 24 0	5 8 0
	Family with 5 children 30 0	5 14 0
	and so continuing	and so continuing

⁵ This point, which had not been made by Mr. Piddington in "The Next Step," contributed to the undoing of the subsequent Government bill which, in accordance with the suggestion in the Judgment, provided for child endowment even where owing to "margin of skill" the father's wage was well above the living wage and the children themselves were by hypothesis not necessitous.

illustrating a specimen schedule of Family Basic Income made up of Basic Wage of £4 4s. as at present and an Endowment of 6s. for each child in family payable to the mother.

As to finance he pointed out that industry already paid for a camouflaged motherhood endowment for two children in the New South Wales and West Australian schemes, and for three children in the rest of our arbitration systems. For Australian conditions he advocated, as alone suitable, a percentage contribution proportionate to the actual wages bill of each employer. This was the method adopted by the committee appointed by the Queensland Government in 1926 to report upon the finances of Child Endowment scheme, of which Mr. Piddington had been chairman. The effect of the finding was that child endowment for each child under 14 of any employee, whatever the employee's earnings or income might be, could be financed by a contribution at the rate of 1% upon the "available wages bill" of the State, for every shilling per week determined by Parliament.

A similar percentage is reached for New South Wales by the method of ascertaining the portion of the national dividend of New South Wales which goes to employees by way of wages or salary, and comparing this with the amount for child endowment. To finance the hypothetical rate of 6s. used in the table of family basic income given above, a contribution of 6% upon the available wages bill would be required. As an illustration of the working of such a scheme, he showed that the percentage charged would be equivalent to a payment of 5s. per week for each adult male employee receiving the present basic wage of £4 4s., or 2s. 6d. for each adult female employee receiving the basic wage of £2 2s. 6d., and in like ratio for other classes of employee.

He adverted also to the allowance for children of non-employees which both the Federal leaders appeared to advocate. Such non-employees (*e.g.* farmers, dairymen, fruit-growers, self-employees, professional men and traders in a small way of business) gain no benefit from the doctrine of basic wage, nor would their children (numbering 254,000 in New South Wales) from child endowment if limited to children of employees. "With regard to financing motherhood endowment for this class, there is no direct logical obligation for contribution from industry, and the necessary pool could be created through the medium of the consolidated revenue" (page 15).

He set out in the following table, the benefit to employers under Child Endowment assuming (a) an endowment for mothers of 6s. for each child under 14, (b) retention of the £4 4s. basic wage for adult males, and (c) financing of the

fund by a percentage contribution from employers of 6% upon the wages bill.

BENEFIT TO EMPLOYERS UNDER CHILD ENDOWMENT.

No. of children in family.	Total number of persons benefited including parents.	Basic family income including motherhood endowment.	Total Cost to Employers.
		£ s. d.	
1	180,000	4 10 0	Six per cent. (6%) upon wages bill, being for those who employ adult males, the equivalent of £4 9s., i.e., £4 4s. paid to the basic wage employee and 5s. to the Treasury and like ratio for other classes of employees.
2	200,000	4 16 0	
3	174,000	5 2 0	
4	125,000	5 8 0	
5	76,000	5 14 0	
6 and over	59,000	6 0 0	

III.

THE GOVERNMENT'S FAMILY ENDOWMENT BILL.

On the 8th February, 1927, the Labour Government⁶ introduced into the Legislative Assembly the Family Endowment Bill, which briefly stated, provided (a) for the endowment of mothers in respect of their children under the age of 14 years (whether children of wage-earners or not) at the rate of 5s. per week where the family income of mother, husband and children did not exceed £364 *per annum* (or £7 per week); (b) for the establishment of a Family Endowment Fund and for the contribution thereto to be fixed by Parliament; and (c) for certain necessary machinery clauses modelled on those of the *Widows' Pensions Act*, 1925, to enable claims to be investigated and paid.

According to the accompanying Memorandum of Statistical and Financial Data, the estimated cost of the endowment for 487,930 dependent children other than Crown employees

⁶ In the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales, which consists of 90 members elected at a general election on 24th June, 1925, the Labour Government, under Mr. J. T. Lang, commands a majority of 2, but has no majority in the Legislative Council, which at present consists of 97 members appointed for life without remuneration. The Government has made repeated efforts without success to induce the Governor to make additional appointments to the Legislative Council for the purpose of ensuring a working majority for the Government in that body, but the Governor, relying on the discretion conferred upon him by Art. VI of H.M. Instructions to the Governor of New South Wales of 29th October, 1900, has informed the Government that he will make no further appointments to the Legislative Council on the advice of Ministers during the life of the present Parliament (which must come to an end in 1928). The reason for this policy the Governor has declared to be the refusal of the Ministry to undertake not to utilize its majority to abolish the Legislative Council without submitting the question of abolition to the electorate at a General Election. For an account of this constitutional controversy see *The Round Table* (1926), No. 63, p. 623 and pp. 628-9.

and of 59,710 children of Crown employees was £7,761,000. The levy of $6\frac{1}{2}\%$ on salaries and wages paid by employers by which it was proposed to meet this cost, was estimated to produce £6,589,000, leaving a balance of £1,172,000 to be met by the Treasury from other sources of revenue.

The Government's original intention is understood to have been to fix the income limit of employees at £750, so as to include the whole industrial zone in accordance with industrial practice in New South Wales and as set by the *Workmen's Compensation Act*. Financial considerations compelled a reduction to the £364 limit, and the benefit was originally fixed at 6s. The Government subsequently decided to extend the benefit to the children of non-employees, and to raise the necessary funds therefor by reducing the benefit from 6s. to 5s., a sum less than half of what may be taken to be the average cost of maintaining a child from birth. As to the cost of child maintenance, it appears from the Commissioner's Judgment that the cost of each child is 11s. From other sources it was estimated that the first child costs 10% more than the second or subsequent child, that the fourth and subsequent child costs slightly less than 11s., and that 11s., therefore, is the average cost. Inlying expenses may be deemed to be covered by the bonus of £5 under the (Federal) *Maternity Allowance Act*, 1912. On the new standard of living of £5 6s., the average cost of maintaining a child might, in accordance with usual statistical practice, which estimates this cost at one-seventh of the family income, be taken at 15s. The endowment of 5s. proposed by the bill was therefore modest.

IV.

ACTION IN THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

The trenchant criticism which the Government's proposals encountered in the Press and the Legislative Assembly, where the bill was forced through all stages by use of the closure, did not become effective until the measure came before the Legislative Council, where its most cogent critic, the Hon. J. Ashton, concentrated on the following defects and objections:

1. Inasmuch as the present basic wage of £4 4s., which was to remain unaltered, sufficed for a man, wife and one child on Mr. Piddington's new standard, the bill proposed that the first child of the family should be paid for twice over.

In particular it was shown that in respect of the 60,700 one-child families of male adult workers already provided for, the bill would make a further payment of £789,000. This sum added to the cost of paying for the phantom children of 288,500 childless workers would bring the total over-payments to more than £4,500,000.⁷

⁷ See *N.S.W. Parliamentary Debates*: Session 1926-7 (24th Feb., 1927). No. 30, p. 1543, Hon. J. Ashton.

2. There was no sound reason for extending the benefit of child endowment to wage-earners on the £7 a week level since there was nothing to show that their children were necessitous. To include wage-earners of this class was an illegitimate device for raising skilled wages under the cloak of providing for fictitiously necessitous children.
3. Extension of the benefit to children of non-wage earners subject to the same income limit of £7 per week resulted in gross anomalies.⁸
4. The immense estimated cost of the scheme (7½ millions sterling) would add an additional handicap to industry in New South Wales as compared with Victoria. This sum was equivalent to an amount sufficient to pay interest of the £150,000,000 of new State debt; it was a little more than 75% of the sum of Federal and State income taxes collected in New South Wales; it was £500,000 in excess of the total of New South Wales income tax, stamp and probate duties, and nearly £100,000 more than the aggregate sum of all rates collected throughout New South Wales plus the Water and Sewerage rates of the Boards of the Metropolitan, the Hunter and Grafton districts.⁹
5. The inequity of charging industry with the main cost of a measure of social amelioration.

To these objections it was answered in Parliament and the Press:

1. That the cost of the scheme was less by one million sterling than the only practical alternative; an increase in the flat-rate basic wage of, say, 9s. necessary to equate it to the cost of the new standard in the Board of Trade area for the Board of Trade domestic unit.
2. Except by fixing an income limit at £364 (above the necessitous-children level) there was no way of maintaining the margins for skill.
3. A statutory endowment limited to necessitous children was deemed to be impracticable.

The theoretical justification for the apparent double payment of the first child also deserves mention, although no stress was laid upon it by Government speakers in either House. It is (1) that the proposed child endowment scheme required to be linked up with the living wage determined on some flat-rate basis, and (2) that the modest character of the proposed endowment, *viz.* 5s., as against some amount lying between 11s. and 15s. (being the actual cost of the child) made it not unreasonable to select as the point of junction the time-honoured family unit of the New South Wales Board of Trade. This choice would no doubt allow the unmarried men and married couples with less than two children more than the newly determined standard of living, and those with more than two children less, yet with the minimum of injustice all round. Any scheme short of full endowment of children,

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 1544, where these anomalies are expounded.

⁹ *Ibid.*

if the living wage is determined on the basis of man and wife, was bound to leave a greater or less residuum of injustice.

The Select Committee and its Results.

In view of the inadequate discussion in the Legislative Council, by Resolution of 25th February, 1927, referred the bill to a Select Committee for consideration and report—more particularly with regard to its probable effect upon industry.

The Select Committee (Hon. E. H. Farrar, Chairman) at its first meeting on 2nd March, passed a resolution that "in view of the prorogation of Parliament, the Government be requested to make provision by legislation or otherwise to enable this committee to sit during recess," and the resolution was duly communicated to the Minister in charge of the bill in the Legislative Council. Deeming this request to be a device for indefinite shelving of this bill in that House, the State Ministry on 2nd March waited upon the Governor, Sir Dudley de Chair, requesting the appointment of additional members in order to ensure a Government majority in the Council. The request having been refused, the Minister on 4th March by a motion of urgency moved the Council (a) to rescind the resolution of 25th February referring the bill to a Select Committee, and (b) to resume consideration of the bill in a second reading.¹⁰ This motion was rejected.¹¹

The Government then introduced in the Legislative Assembly on 8th March, an *Industrial Arbitration (Living Wage) Bill*¹² with the object of "empowering and directing" the Industrial Commissioner to declare a living wage for adult male employees throughout the State based on the new standard of living as sufficient to maintain a man, his wife and two children under the age of 14 years, and this without waiting for the expiration of six months' period fixed by the *Industrial Arbitration Act, 1926*. The Standing Orders having been suspended, the Bill was passed through all stages in the Legislative Assembly on 8th March and on the same day was introduced into the Legislative Council, which had also suspended its Standing Orders, and was read a first time.¹³

In Committee of the Legislative Council on the following day an important amendment was carried against the Government with the effect of merely "empowering," instead of "empowering and directing" the Industrial Commissioner to declare a living wage for adult male employees in State or any part of it, and this without waiting for the expiry of the

¹⁰ See *op. cit.*, No. 35, p. 1894.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1896.

¹² *Op. cit.*, No. 37, p. 2075.

¹³ See *op. cit.*, No. 37, p. 2043.

six months' period required under the Act of 1926.¹⁴ The purpose of this amendment, as the mover explained,¹⁵ was to leave an unfettered discretion to Commissioner and Parliament alike, to the former in declaring a living wage, to the latter in dealing, if so advised and at a later date, with the problem of family endowment. With this amendment the bill was read a third time, and returned on the same day to the Legislative Assembly.¹⁶

V.

THE DEADLOCK AND THE FREE CONFERENCE.

In order to overcome the deadlock thus created, the Government had recourse to the provisions of a Free Conference with the Legislative Council contained in Art. 145-53 of the Standing Orders of that body.¹⁷ The Premier, Mr. Lang, accordingly, moved and carried in Committee on 10th March, a motion recording the disagreement of the Legislative Assembly with the Legislative Council's amendment to the bill, and nominating managers of the Conference on behalf of the Legislative Assembly.¹⁸

The message having been reported from the Legislative Assembly requesting a Free Conference with reference (be it observed) solely to the Council's amendment to the Industrial Arbitration (Living Wage Declaration) Bill, the Council, when agreeing on the same day to the request and appointing managers on its behalf instructed them also "to consider family endowment in relation thereto."¹⁹ And the two questions of

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, No. 38, p. 2145.

¹⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 2147.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 2151.

¹⁷ See *The New South Wales Parliamentary Handbook* (10th Ed.), 1921, pp. 38-9. It is to be noted that a Free Conference is one at which the respective managers for Council and Assembly "shall be at liberty to confer freely . . ." (Art. 152), as contrasted with an Ordinary Conference at which "the matter to be communicated shall be in writing" (Art. 150-1). In its desire for expedition, the New South Wales Legislative Assembly omitted a step of procedure—notification to the Legislative Council of the Legislative Assembly's motion of disagreement with the Council's amendment and request for reconsideration thereof.

No Free Conference between managers for Lords and Commons has been held in the United Kingdom since 1836 (Municipal Corporations Bill), the latest previous precedent having occurred in 1740 (see May's *Parliamentary Practice*, pp. 534-5).

¹⁸ *N.S.W. Parliamentary Debates, Session 1926-7*, No. 39, p. 2253, p. 2260. The managers for the Legislative Assembly were: Mr. Bavin (Leader of the Opposition), Mr. Ball, Mr. Levy and Mr. B. Buttenshaw (members of the Opposition); and Mr. McTiernan (Attorney-General), Mr. Lazzarini (Minister of Agriculture) and the Premier. *Ibid.*, p. 2260.

¹⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 2204. The Legislative Council, on the motion of the Hon. A. C. Willis (Minister in charge of the bill), (a) agreed to the request for a Free Conference on the amendment to the bill in question; (b) directed the Conference to be held in No. 1 Committee Room on Tuesday, 15th March, at 11.30 a.m., and appointed as managers on behalf of the Council the Hon. Sir Joseph Carruthers, the Hon. J. Ashton, the Hon. Professor J. B. Peden, the Hon. W. Brooks, the Hon. E. H. Farrar (members of the Opposition), the Hon. A. C. Willis, the Hon. J. F. Coates, the Hon. J. M. Concannon, the Hon. M. J. Connington, and the Hon. J. Culbert (members of the Government party), whom it further instructed "to consider family endowment in relation thereto," and (c) directed that a message containing the above particulars be forwarded to the Legislative Assembly.

living wage and family endowment were placed on the agenda of the Conference, when the Legislative Assembly by motion of the 15th March agreed to the time, place and subject-matter of the Conference, consideration of the bill under discussion being, of course, suspended in both Houses pending the Conference.²⁰

Report of Managers of Free Conference.

The Conference sat from 15th until 22nd March, when the following report was made to the Legislative Council²¹ and Legislative Assembly:²²

The Conference was unable to arrive at a unanimous decision, but a majority agreed as follows:

- (1) A scheme of family endowment is a necessary complement of a living wage system.
- (2) Subject to the establishment of a satisfactory scheme of child endowment, the standard of living and a living wage for male adult employees should be determined as follows: Any determination of standard of living shall be in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of the *Industrial Arbitration Amendment Act, 1927*. In any determination of living wage for male adult employees such living wage shall be based on a standard of living so determined and on the requirements of a man and wife without children.
- (3) While the standard of living should not be lower for rural employees, the Industrial Commission should have power to declare a separate living wage for rural employees or any section thereof.
- (4) Any scheme of family endowment adopted in this State should be regarded as provisional pending the determination of the question whether the matter can be dealt with on a Federal basis.
- (5) The amount of the allowance for children should be not less than 5s. a week per child.
- (6) The scheme should apply to children up to the age of 14 years, of all persons within the prescribed limits, whether wage or salary earners or not. The Conference is unable to agree as to the limits of income up to which the endowment should be payable.

(Signed) A. C. WILLIS.

On behalf of the Managers of the Legislative Council.

The second reading of the Family Endowment Bill was then resumed in the Legislative Council,²³ the report of the Select Committee on the bill having been presented at the same sitting.²⁴

In commenting on the report of the Conference the Hon. J. B. Peden drew attention to the fact that it contained only

²⁰ See *op. cit.*, No. 41, p. 2283.

²¹ See *ibid.*, p. 2287.

²² See *ibid.*, p. 2333.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 2288.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 2287.

one unqualified statement, *viz.*, the first: "A scheme of family endowment is a necessary complement of the living wage system." All the other propositions were qualified by the opening sentence of the second proposition which begins: "Subject to the establishment of a satisfactory scheme of child endowment."

The first proposition he defended briefly as follows: A living wage is based on the principle of paying every man who works in this community a wage not measured by service rendered but measured in the first instance by his needs. On this principle employer and employee are not allowed to make a contract of employment with each other except on the terms that the wage to be paid to the employee will be sufficient for his needs having regard to our Australian habits and standards. But immediately the problem arises of determining for general use the measure of needs. Is the measure to be the single man? The childless married man? The family with one child or two or three or more children? Hitherto wage tribunals in default of guidance from Parliament have worked out with the aid of statistics the needs of an average family, which when converted to a wage inevitably proves too much for the unmarried man and too little for the man with a family larger than the average. As it is impossible to work out a scientific system of a living wage on the basis of needs, which will be just and fair to every individual worker, a scheme of family endowment is the necessary corollary of a living wage system. Furthermore, inasmuch as a wage based on the needs of an unmarried worker would discriminate against married men, the domestic unit for the living wage must be a man and wife. The report then says, provided a satisfactory scheme of child endowment is established, then the living wage is to be determined in accordance with the standard of living but on the basis of the requirements of a man and wife, without children. To get these two principles embodied in law would, he urged, be an enormous advance in dealing with industrial and social problems.²⁵

The Committee thereafter passed against the Government amendments moved by the Hon. J. B. Peden and the Hon. J. Ashton respectively, by which the basis of the payment was radically, and almost unrecognizably, altered. The effect of the former amendment was to make the date of commencement of the *Family Endowment Act* contingent on the previous declaration by the Industrial Commissioner of a living wage for adult male employees *based on the requirements of a man*

²⁵ See *ibid.*, 2289-91.

and wife without children.²⁶ The effect of the second amendment was to substitute for the Government's income-limit of £364 (or £7 per week) a provision whereby endowment should not be paid so as to increase the family income beyond the sum of the living wage and 5s. for each dependent child in family.

"Family income," it should be mentioned, means for the purposes of the Act, "the combined income of a claimant, his spouse, and children under the age of fourteen years arising from any source whatsoever, whether in or out of the State," and "'income' shall be deemed to include (*inter alia*) any endowment under the Act, 5% of the value of any real or personal property owned by the claimant or his spouse other than the residence in which he resides or his furniture or personal effects therein, or by his children under the age of fourteen . . . and, further, any amount applied for the maintenance or education of any dependent child in virtue of any will, settlement *et cetera*" (§ 14 (a), (b), (c), and (e)).

The object of the last-mentioned amendment²⁷ was to secure that endowment should be paid only in respect of children for whom the family income, measured by the current standard of living, did not provide. Its operation may be illustrated thus: taking, for illustration, a living wage of £4 4s., the wife of a man, with two children, whose income throughout the last twelve months has averaged £4 14s. a week will receive no endowment for his children, because £4 14s. a week equals the living wage *plus* twice 5s. On the other hand, the wife of a man with three children under 14, who has averaged £4 9s., will receive 5s. each for two children.

Among minor amendments made by the Council in Committee were:

- (1) Exclusion from the calculation of family income of the earnings of a mother from casual employment, and of an employee from overtime in his ordinary employment.

²⁶ See *loc. cit.*, 2323, 2326, and 2330. The majority for this amendment was 6 in a House of 54.

As amended, Clause (2) of the bill reads: "This Act shall commence on a day to be appointed by the Governor and notified by proclamation published in the Gazette, but the day shall not be so notified unless and until a living wage for male adult employees has been declared on the requirements of a man and wife without children."

²⁷ See *loc. cit.*, 2331-3. The majority for this amendment was 5.

As amended, Clause 14 (2) reads: "No certificate for endowment shall be issued in any case where—

(a) The family income in the twelve months immediately preceding the date of the claim exceeded the aggregate of the following amounts, namely, the amount for one year of the living wage based on the requirements of a man and wife without children, and for the time being in force and appropriate to the case, and the amount of £13 (or 5s. per week) for each child in family."

The mover of the amendment explained that it had been drafted so as to cover the case that there might be two basic wages, one for the metropolitan area and one for the rural employees.

- (2) Cancellation of a provision permitting appeal to the Minister from the determination of the Endowment Fund Commissioner (Clause 23).
- (3) Two amendments to Clause 14 consequential on amendment of the income-limit (Clause 14).

Three amendments were important and contentious:

- (a) Two amendments in the definition Clause 3 under the words "child" and "employee," the effect of which was to exclude from the benefit of the bill children of employees working under Federal Awards.²⁸
- (b) A provision that the employers' contribution to the Endowment Fund should be *per* employee in his employment, instead of a percentage of his total wages or salaries bill, as provided in the bill (Clause 39 (4)).

By Message of 24th March the Legislative Assembly communicated to the Council its disagreement with the three last-mentioned amendments.

Eventually a compromise was effected, which converted the bill into an agreed measure. The Council accepted the extension of the bill to employees under Federal Awards, waived insistence on a *per capita* basis of calculating the employers' levy, and secured the assent of the Assembly to a provision entitling the employer under Federal Awards to a deduction of 10% on wages paid under such Awards before calculating his wages-bill as subject to levy, this with the object of giving effect in total wages bill to the difference of 10% which in fact exists between State and Federal basic wages.

The merits of the final settlement are (1) that endowment for necessitous children is definitely separated from the basic wage which is now provided with a new and statutory domestic unit; (2) that the tax on industry in respect of family endowment is reduced from 6½% to 3%—a levy which conceivably may itself be offset by a reduction in the living wage for the new unit; and (3), in the wider sphere, that the Federal Government has been moved to call a conference to consider means for establishing a Federal scheme of family endowment. On the other hand, the agreed measure is unsatisfactory to Labour in not maintaining marginal increases in remuneration in respect of skill—this defect, however, is strictly speaking irrelevant either in a living wage based on the needs of *unskilled* workmen or in a scheme for endowing *necessitous* children. From the point of view of legislative machinery, the advantage of round table conference conducted in private over partisan discussion and voting in public appears to have been demonstrated.

²⁸ While exclusion of certain children from benefits raised no constitutional question, the exclusion of employees under Federal Awards might be open to challenge as amounting to discrimination against the Commonwealth (*per* The Hon. J. B. Peden, *op. cit.*, No. 42, pp. 2375, 2377-8).

The next step, appropriately enough, lies with Mr. Piddington, the Industrial Commissioner. Two courses appear to be open to him: (a) To declare a new standard of living which would justify retention of the present living wage of £4 4s. as sufficing for "a man and wife without children"; (b) while retaining the standard of living judgment of 15th December, 1926, to declare a new and reduced living wage for the new domestic unit. That such reduction is inevitable is the fear of some Labour members of the Upper House,²⁹ and the hope of not a few members of the Opposition.³⁰ Mr. Willis scorns his colleagues' apprehension.³¹

Whatever happens, there will be opportunity for revision both of the living wage and family endowment schemes after the Federal Conference, called by Mr. Bruce on 7th March, has met in Melbourne in June.

In conclusion, the suggestion may be offered that should a Federal scheme of family endowment prove feasible and involve a general reduction in living wages, the Federal Government is not without means of dispelling some part of Labour's not unwarranted fear that reduction in the cost of production thereby caused will not be reflected in cost of living. For this purpose machinery exists in the Tariff. Reduction in the prices of food, clothing and miscellaneous items might at least be stimulated by judicious relaxation of the impediments to foreign competition. On the main element of working class expenditure, *viz.* housing, this remedy, however, can have little immediate effect.

As to the possible effect of the new domestic unit for New South Wales on wages in that State and in Australia generally, the following conjectures are offered with diffidence.

(1) If a Federal system of family endowment should prove to be feasible, it would seem to involve the adoption by the Federal Arbitration Court of the New South Wales domestic unit of man and wife in place of its present unit of man, wife and three children, and this with a corresponding reduction in the Federal living wage for unskilled labour. If this result were brought about and should lead to a general reduction throughout Australia in the nominal living wage without impairment of the effective wage, it is conceived that one of the principal impediments to the intensive development of Australia's resources would be removed, and the passing of the New South Wales Act would gain national importance.

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, 2397 (Mr. Culbert), 2302 (Mr. Concannon), 2316 (Mr. Connington).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Mr. Ashton.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 2320.

(2) If, on the other hand, a Federal system of child endowment should not prove feasible and the present difference in domestic unit as between the State and Federal spheres in New South Wales were to be maintained, the recent innovation would tend to augment the industrial chaos. The natural inclination of employees working under State Awards to attempt to gain the benefit of the higher Federal domestic unit by the device of fictitious interstate disputes will no doubt be strengthened, but as regards married men may be checked by certain limiting factors established by the New South Wales *Family Endowment Act*. While it is true that the benefits of that Act extend to employees in New South Wales working under Federal Awards, these are only obtainable on New South Wales conditions, *viz.*, that the claimant's family-income for the last twelve months does not exceed the New South Wales living wage *plus* 5s. per week for each dependent child in family. Thus if the Federal basic wage were maintained at £4 11s. 6d. and the New South Wales living wage were reduced to £3 19s., a man with three children would be as well off on the State living wage, since all three children would be endowable. As regards the children of the same man working under a Federal Award no endowment would be received for the first two and only 2s. 6d. for the third. A man of this class, then, would have nothing to gain by a change-over to the Federal *régime*.

The effect of the limiting factor would be confined, however, to men with three or more children. To unmarried men, and to married men with less than three children, the advantage of coming under a Federal Award in the circumstances set out above is obvious and immediate. On the general question, therefore, of attempt to transfer to the Federal sphere, the policy of a trade union may well be determined by the relative strength in its ranks of members who are (a) within and (b) without the sphere of the old State unit.

(3) Domestic unit and family endowment, having been alike placed under Parliamentary control, are, of course, capable of being altered to the advantage of Labour by any Labour Government with a working majority in both Houses, or in the Legislative Assembly alone, if the Legislative Council happened to be abolished.

BRITISH ETHICAL THEORIES: THE INTUITIONIST REACTION AGAINST HOBBS.

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THE publication of *Leviathan* in 1651 was the impetus to a considerable output of books on moral philosophy in England. It was inevitable that controversy would arise out of the teachings of Hobbes, but that there should have been such an ethical outburst as the result of one book is a remarkable tribute not only to the importance of its subject-matter but also to the intellectual activity of the time. English philosophical speculation, however, has always been comprehensive rather than systematic. It has appealed widely because of its breadth of outlook. A respect for concrete fact and the desire to give reality its due led its greatest exponents straight to experience, which they investigated thoroughly, although they often failed to interpret it rightly; and in spite of interests which were in the main practical, their thought was none the less profound. As so few of them were academics, there is in their writings a pleasing freedom from highly technical phraseology—a gain in itself apart from the fact that it opened their works to the average intelligent reader. This interest in the practical affairs of life is manifested also in a reverence for ethical postulates. It was to be expected, then, that there would be in England animated discussion of the truths of morality. At any rate, until John Locke opened a new way for philosophical inquiry from 1689 onwards, militant young churchmen with an eye to the main chance thundered against Hobbes, while others with some understanding of what his doctrines really involved showed no little skill in criticism of a constructive nature, and incidentally made permanent contributions of their own to philosophy. To some critics, good and evil for the individual seemed to be determined by his own selfish desires and aversions; to others, it appeared that morality was a matter of arbitrary enactment by the State. Among the earlier opponents of the political theories Sir Robert Filmer (*Originall of Government*, 1652) and James Harrington (*Commonwealth of Oceana*, 1656) are important; while John Bramhall, Bishop of Derry, a vigorous upholder of the doctrine of freedom, used the words atheist, blasphemy, impiety, which called forth the complaint

of Hobbes himself (*True Liberty of Human Actions*, 1655; *Castigations of Mr. Hobbes*, 1658).

Since it is the purpose of this article to deal solely with ethical doctrines, it will be necessary to restrict its scope to the consideration of those writers whose desire to refute the materialism of Hobbes and its bearing on the moral life led them to the endeavour to establish the independence of moral truths and to base them on the plain facts of human nature. They are usually classified into two main groups: the intellectualists, of whom Cudworth and Samuel Clarke were the chief; and the sentimentalists, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Joseph Butler. As there were no schools of philosophy in the strict sense, however, in England, at least until the days of the Utilitarians, to deal with these thinkers as members of this or that school is to swamp their individuality. Clarke's doctrines may have been "made on the lines of Cudworth's reasoning"; Hutcheson, influenced in the first place by Shaftesbury, himself influenced and was at different times a debtor to both Butler and Hume. No single writer among them built up a system or was followed by a body of admiring disciples. Simply all were intuitionists playing their several parts in the reaction against the naturalism of Hobbes, and especially against the low view he seemed to take of human nature. The first note of antagonism to the moral teaching of Hobbes was sounded in Richard Cumberland's able treatise *On the Laws of Nature* (1672), the first attempt in England at philosophic ethics. Its doctrines of the social nature of man and of the common good as the supreme principle of morality anticipate the direction taken by much of the ethical thought of the eighteenth century.

Hobbes' theory begins with a primitive and brutish egoism—every man a law unto himself—and ends in the opposite extreme of political absolutism, the basis of which is fear. His ethical teaching, admirable as it is in itself, is based on a false psychology and on a mistaken conception of the social order. The laws of morality are derived from the natural instincts of self-preservation and self-assertion. There is not anything in man originally that makes him social or moral; that we come to live in accord with others is due solely to our powers of foreseeing and of fearing the consequences of an unreasoning gratification of instinctive impulse. Hobbes is wrong, too, in his belief that authority must reside ultimately in the State as such. For him the State is not a means of expressing the will of the society, but rather a means of imposing a rational or moral order upon a mere collection of individuals who, but for the power of the State, would necessarily disintegrate into factions and fighting. We are left

with two standards of morality: the State provides the external sanction of social morality; self-interest is the only possible internal criterion of the desirability or the unpleasantness of action. The *good* comes to mean not only the good which I desire, but also that which is approved by the civil government, as making for social peace and against the natural brutish condition of man.

English ethical theories in modern times are either naturalistic or intuitionist. According to naturalism moral ideas are secondary products, that is to say, they are derived from wants (Hobbes), feelings (Hume), or instincts (H. Spencer) which are originally neither moral nor immoral, but simply natural; further, these capacities, besides being the springs of action in man, are also the ultimate forces which shape his destiny. On the contrary, the intuitionists maintained that moral ideas are not secondary and derived, but primary and irreducible, capable of being intuitively discerned by means of a natural light of conscience or reason within us. Once we are able to understand the alternatives of action and the issue, we cannot fail intuitively to recognize which is the more moral of two possible actions. The defect in both theories was that they were based upon an inadequate examination of human nature and of the human mind. For the ethical naturalist a thin stream of more or less disparate sensations, feelings and appetites is the complete momentary expression of the individual consciousness; the intuitionist felt that a self of some kind or other was necessary, even though he could not satisfactorily demonstrate its nature and existence. Not until we come to T. H. Green do we find an attempt made to solve the problem by a reconsideration of the facts of experience. The pseudo-scientific tendency of naturalism following Hobbes sought to explain morality in terms of psychology—in other words, to maintain that human conduct expresses human nature. This developed as psychological hedonism. Intuitionism is not a rival theory so much as a reaction against naturalism. It arose out of the *lumen naturale* doctrine of Descartes. This essay will deal with the philosophical intuitionists, not with the dogmatic intuitionists of the Scottish school who dissented from Hume.

The intuitionist reaction against the naturalism of Hobbes was led by Ralph Cudworth (1617-88), one of the Cambridge Platonists, and Dr. Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), rector of St. James', Westminster. These writers endeavoured *first* to establish the truths of morality as an eternal and unalterable system existing in some sense independently of the human will; *second*, they contended that human nature contained altruistic (social and moral) elements which were held to be

as natural, *i.e.* original, as impulses purely individualistic and self-regarding. The latter contention was more strongly emphasized in the works of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Butler. Nevertheless, although Cudworth and Clarke were mainly concerned to establish the independence of the truths of morality, the admission of social impulses in man is an integral part of their doctrine. It is in this distinction of emphasis that the names intellectualist and sentimentalist arose. In the end Cudworth and Clarke tended to make reason the source of all knowledge, whether sensory, scientific or moral, to base morality in the Platonic fashion upon abstract logical principles rather than, as with their intuitionist successors, to find its principles in human nature. In fact, so far as the question of the source of morality is concerned, Butler stands closer to Hobbes than to Cudworth and Clarke. He agrees with Hobbes that the springs of moral action originate in man; his objection is that Hobbes' analysis of human nature is one-sided and imperfect. Two factors of significance arise from this discussion: there is an increasing tendency (i) to find the principles of morality in man himself—in other words, there is development in a direction which is psychological; (ii) to discriminate between pure and practical reason, and to assign the truths of morality to the latter.

Cudworth as it were comes incidentally to moral questions in the course of a wider inquiry into the essentials of true religion. In *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, 1678, he sets out to confute atheism, the revival of materialism by Hobbes being the spur to his endeavour, and his treatises on morality and free-will were designed to complete this work. For him atheists of whatever persuasion were materialists—or as he called them, “corporealists”—and the three principles his interest it was to establish are the reality of a supreme Divine Intelligence, the eternal and unchangeable nature of goodness, and the intellectual and moral freedom of man. With the second of these Cudworth deals in his *Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, published in 1731, forty-three years after his death. The truths of morality, he contends, have fixed natures of their own, independent of opinion or of will; “. . . moral good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest . . . cannot possibly be arbitrary things, made by will without nature; because it is universally true, that things are what they are, not by will but by nature.”¹ The laws of morality are inherent in the very nature of the universe; “. . . the natures of good and evil, just and unjust, really exist in the world.”² The main part of the book,

¹ The references are to Selby-Bigge's *British Moralists*, sec. 813.

² *Ibid.*, sec. 816.

however, is taken up with epistemological questions. There is a lengthy and hostile criticism of the sensual empiricism of Hobbes, in which Cudworth concludes in effect that through sensation we attain no knowledge of permanent reality, for sensation is merely passive apprehension of particular things or images which exist for the subject only at the moment they are actually perceived. The true objects of knowledge are universal conceptions comprehended only by reason; and these general conceptions, which cannot be known through sense, express for us the reality of the world.

From the essential and immutable natures of things Cudworth proceeds to the immutable and eternal nature of moral truths. Ideas such as moral good and evil, just and unjust, are universal conceptions; their essential nature and objective excellence are known to us only through reason. Reason is active; “. . . knowledge and intellection cannot possibly spring from sense . . . but from an active power of the mind.”³ While for Hobbes good and evil are determined by the sovereign (though perhaps not strictly a correct interpretation, this is what his opponents generally ascribed to him), for Cudworth they are independent of mere arbitrary will, whether human or divine. Morality is possible only if there be a God, “that is, an Infinite Eternal Mind that is the first original and source of all things, whose nature is the first rule and exemplar of morality.”⁴

Having established the eternal and unalterable nature of moral laws Cudworth goes no further. He does not enter into any detailed application of his principles. It is to Henry More that we must turn for an exposition of ethical axioms intuitively manifest (*Enchiridion Ethicum*, 1666). More, however, is antecedent to Cudworth, and it is Samuel Clarke who carries on the main line of inquiry. Clarke’s *Boyle Lectures* delivered at St. Paul’s in the years 1704 and 1705 were directly antagonistic to Hobbes. In the second series of sermons, the *Discourse upon Natural Religion*, he claims that the laws of morality themselves provide the means by which we may distinguish the reasonableness and fitness of actions; “. . . the mind of man cannot avoid giving its assent to the eternal law of righteousness, that is, cannot but acknowledge the reasonableness and fitness of men’s governing all their actions by the rule of right or equity; and this assent is a formal obligation upon every man, actually and constantly to conform himself to that rule.”⁵ From this he deduces certain particular “duties of morality or natural religion,” the

³ *Ibid.*, sec. 845.

⁴ *Ibid.*, sec. 846.

⁵ *Ibid.*, sec. 498.

fundamental "rules of righteousness," known intuitively to be eternally fit and reasonable, requiring no proof beyond themselves. These deal with reverence to God, equity and benevolence to our fellow-men, and self-preservation.

This statement of the nature of self-evident moral principles is the weakest part of Clarke's theory. It is because of his contention that the truths of morality are as eternal and unalterable as the axioms of mathematics that he is of interest here. With Cudworth he insists upon the objectivity and impartiality of moral principles. Neither will stand for a relative morality; goodness is absolute, the same for all. Clarke's conception is of a world of moral relations, analogous in some sense to the physical universe; there are "in moral matters certain necessary and unalterable respects or relations of things, which have not their original from arbitrary and positive constitution, but are of external necessity in their own nature"; for example, "that which is holy and good . . . is not therefore holy and good, because 'tis commanded to be done, but is therefore commanded of God, because 'tis holy and good."⁶ God does not arbitrarily create the laws of morality, but determines Himself to act in agreement with them. The necessary and eternal relations of morality determine the "fitness of things," *i.e.* they make it fit and reasonable for mankind to act in accordance with justice and equity.

Not alone from the side of reason did the intellectualists attack the moral doctrines of Hobbes; they did not hesitate in their condemnation of his conception of the laws of nature as well. In this regard their arguments were largely polemical, and their replies took the form of mere contradiction. In one instance Clarke says, in passing, that it may reasonably be presumed, "that if Mr. Hobbes had lived in such a state of nature (as he describes), and had happened to be himself the suffering party, he would in this case have been of another opinion."⁷ Clarke concluded, quite falsely, that Hobbes had asserted the distinction between right and wrong to have been invented by human compact, whereas these facts are "in themselves totally and essentially different, even altogether as much, as white and black, light and darkness."⁸ The error here was to take Hobbes' theories as philosophical and moral rather than political. It was not so much in respect of morals that a criticism of his political doctrines was needed as a thorough investigation of his premises and a new examination of human nature. This was to come later. The main value of the doctrines of Cudworth and Clarke is that they insist upon

⁶ *Ibid.*, sec. 507.

⁷ *Ibid.*, sec. 515.

⁸ *Ibid.*, sec. 488.

the necessity and the universality of moral truths. These writers constantly suggest the identity of moral and mathematical relations, and compare them in the endeavour to show that moral and scientific principles have the same rational basis, a procedure which led to the view that the ideas and truths of morality are given to us intuitively by the same reason as enables us to know speculative or scientific truths. This identification of pure and practical reason by Cudworth did not lead him into any great difficulty or inconsistency. It appeared again in Richard Price's treatise, *A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals*, 1757, in which the origin of our ideas of right and wrong is ascribed to "some power of immediate perception in the human mind"—in other words, such ideas arise not from sensation but "from our intuition of the natures of things";⁹ practical reason is active, simply the understanding of the distinctions between moral good and evil, and in no wise different from the comprehension of scientific truths. For Clarke, on the other hand, the fundamental rules of righteousness, the alleged first principles of morals, are not really analogous to the axioms of pure reason, for they require definition, and further, they conflict with one another (e.g. the rules of benevolence and self-preservation). Clarke's statement of the nature of these self-evident moral intuitions merely shows the inadequacy of his system. In Cudworth and Clarke is seen the influence of Platonic doctrines, and of the (then) new thought of Descartes.

The intellectualist tradition in English ethics was carried on by William Wollaston (*The Religion of Nature Delineated*, 1722) and John Balguy (*The Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 1729). It was from the side of the feelings, however, that the second line of attack was to be made against Hobbes; feeling rather than reason came in its turn to be examined as the faculty by which we perceive moral distinctions. The "æsthetic" intuitionists, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, stand midway between Cudworth and Clarke, and Bishop Butler. Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) was the first of those who attempted to show that virtue is real and natural by relating it, not to the "nature of things," but to "human nature" (Selby-Bigge). The social impulses in man are now to be emphasized as the sources of moral endeavour, rather than the "eternal and immutable" nature of moral axioms. In his *Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit* (first printed in 1699, but not exercising any great influence upon the course of English ethical inquiry until after its republication in the second volume of the *Characteristics*,

⁹ *Ibid.*, secs. 605, 612.

1711), Shaftesbury puts forward two important principles: (i) that morality originates in the nature of man; (ii) his doctrine of harmony. By demonstrating the naturalness of man's social impulses and showing that the moral life is a harmonious development of them all, he transfers the centre of ethical interest from abstract reason to the emotional impulses that prompt to social duty. The first task is to determine the nature of the good as social rather than self-regarding, and thus to dispose at once of the "selfish" theories of Hobbes. Briefly, goodness in anything is not determined by itself alone, but through its relation to the system of things; similarly, the good of the species is higher than any individual good. As applied to man, this doctrine of the good implies that virtue (or merit) consists in affections and actions which have as their object the good of humanity. The nature of virtue consists "in a certain just disposition, or proportionable affection of a rational creature towards the moral objects of right and wrong"; "and in this case alone it is we call any creature worthy or virtuous, when it can have the notion of a public interest, and can attain the speculation or science of what is morally good or ill, admirable or blamable, right or wrong."¹⁰ The final standard of right or wrong then is the public interest, the common good of man. This was the first definite expression after Cumberland of a principle which became of great importance in English ethics. Complete self-realization, the harmonious satisfaction of all the powers and faculties of man, as implied for instance in T. H. Green's conception of the moral ideal, involves also the idea of the common good of mankind, in the attainment of which all moral beings may co-operate. Following Shaftesbury, Hutcheson held that the public good is not only the criterion of conduct, but also the basis of rights;¹¹ "there can be no right, or limitation of right, inconsistent with, or opposite to the greatest public good."¹² Moral actions are such as tend to the happiness of others; "virtue is in proportion to the number of persons to whom the happiness shall extend."¹³ With Butler, private and public good coincide perfectly; "to aim at public and private good are so far from being inconsistent, that they mutually promote each other."¹⁴

The characteristic property of the good is harmony or proportion. That is good which is in harmonious relation with the system of which it is a part; virtue is balance within the system of the affections. These affections are (i) natural,

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, secs. 21, 13.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, sec. 112.

¹² *Ibid.*, sec. 183.

¹³ *Ibid.*, sec. 121.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, sec. 203.

i.e. social, tending to the good of the society; (ii) self-affections, leading to the private good of the individual; (iii) the unnatural affections which lead neither to public nor private good. In the application of this principle of harmony Shaftesbury makes use of the idea of a system, and this conception was afterwards taken over by Butler to be used with great effect. Human goodness then consists in being in harmony with the society of which the individual is a member; virtuous conduct is that which is conducive to the common good of man. In the end, self-interest and virtue always coincide in this world; "to be well affected towards the public interest and one's own, is not only consistent, but inseparable . . . moral rectitude, or virtue, must accordingly be the advantage, and vice the injury and disadvantage of every creature."¹⁵ Virtue is the only way of happiness. If any man ceases to promote the general good, he ceases to promote his own happiness. But whether we are to take virtue or happiness as the final criterion of good, Shaftesbury leaves us in doubt.

Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow from 1729 until his death, was the first British philosopher of note who occupied a university chair. He is the chief exponent of the doctrine of the "moral sense." This conception of a kind of feeling, like an æsthetic feeling, accompanying the moral judgment, had already been propounded by some of the Cambridge Platonists, especially Henry More with his "boniform faculty," and Shaftesbury had also used it in his doctrine of the source of moral knowledge. Shaftesbury speaks of a "natural sense of right and wrong," *i.e.* an original capacity "of earliest rise in the soul or affectionate part"¹⁶ through which we are attracted to virtue but feel a repugnance to vice, and which is analogous to our capacity for being attracted by beauty and repelled by ugliness. This doctrine, however, is not an integral part of his system. For Shaftesbury, virtue is never entirely a matter of individual subjective feeling. Actions are good and bad in themselves; goodness is followed for its own sake and on account of its own inherent beauty and worth. Hutcheson developed the theory along more or less original lines in the *Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, 1725, but in its later expression in his greatest work, *A System of Moral Philosophy* (published posthumously, 1755), he showed the influence of Butler's theory of conscience. The moral sense is a "determination of the mind . . . which makes rational actions appear beautiful or deformed," a superior sense by means of which we perceive pleasure in good and

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, sec. 28.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, sec. 23.

right actions, and which are themselves approved as tending towards the public welfare.¹⁷ The moral sense is analogous to the sense of beauty, i.e. our natural capacity for the appreciation of beautiful things. "As the Author of Nature has determined us to receive, by our external senses, pleasant or disagreeable ideas of objects, according as they are useful or hurtful to our bodies; and to receive from uniform objects the pleasures of beauty and harmony, to excite us to the pursuit of knowledge, and to reward us for it . . . in the same manner he has given us a moral sense, to direct our actions, and to give us still nobler pleasures; so that while we are only intending the good of others, we undesignedly promote our own greatest private good."¹⁸ Moral ideas are a native and original possession of the human mind; they are not derived from custom or education—an argument probably directed against Hume. Moral actions are "sincere intentions of the public good," and are to be approved in so far as they tend to the happiness of others. Moral perfection consists in a constant desire to produce happiness; virtue and universal benevolence are in the end identical.

Hutcheson's doctrine of the moral sense is of some value as a criticism of purely "selfish" theories of morality, but so far as the approval or disapproval of moral ideas is concerned, his descriptions of it are not satisfactory. Is the moral sense a perception, or a taste, or an instinct? Or is its function one of active judgment? Just because in any well-developed character the habit of obedience to the moral law becomes a "second nature" (i.e. some disposition, secondary and acquired, having an intellectual background, which has become an intimate part of one's personality), his point of view would seem plausible. But no ethical theory can be satisfactory which treats the moral sense simply as a sense, and does not explain it in a rational manner. When in his *System of Moral Philosophy* Hutcheson spoke of the "dignity and commanding nature" of the moral sense which "from its very nature appears to be designed for regulating and controlling all our powers," he had certainly come under the influence of Butler.¹⁹ If morality is to be attributed to a special sense, can it be held to have an authority to judge all our actions? In Butler's theory of conscience this difficulty is finally resolved. The inward law of conscience is obligatory on the individual; conscience has power and authority to review all the actions of the individual himself, as of other people, and to pass judgment on them.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, secs. 74, 77.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, sec. 87.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, sec. 472.

In Hutcheson we find for the first time a clear distinction drawn between speculative and practical reason. Reason, he holds, is purely theoretical, and cannot of itself provide us with motives to act; it merely aids us in the comparison of actions. Action is determined by will, but the will is not determined to action by reason. Further, the necessity of a psychological basis for morality is not overlooked. Finally, Hutcheson gave to Bentham the principle of "the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers," which was taken over into Utilitarianism with slight change.

Nothing has been attempted in this article beyond the briefest consideration of those tendencies in English ethics which arose out of the opposition to Hobbes. The writings of the various thinkers have been considered, not in detail, but as a developing system of thought, and as a preparation of the way for Butler, perhaps the most typical of the purely English moralists.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE.

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WHAT is, and has been, believed by man about his soul is derived from two sources, imagination and inference. These two activities so constantly overlap one another, that it is not easy to decide how much we owe to each. The products of imagination are as fantastic today as they were in the mind of primitive man; and, with regard to the soul, the data are, and perhaps always will be, insufficient for any inference which may help us to pluck out the heart of our mystery. Perhaps we must say of soul, as Reid said of mind, that we can know it only by its operations. But, even so, man will still go on asking questions, and much of his knowledge has been gained in grappling with problems which admit of no solution. He fancies himself to be aware of soul as something real in himself individually, and is forced to ask: Is it something which can be said to have an existence of its own, or is it a mere name of that self-consciousness, which supposes itself to be directing the mechanism of the material organism, but is really only one quality of that organism, possessing no more independent reality than its other qualities? If it has a real existence of its own, what further inferences can be drawn about it? The discussions of these questions in Plato's *Laws* and in Aristotle's treatise "*De Anima*" suggest that they were the subjects of frequent debate between Plato and those associated with him in the Academy, and that the divergence of men's views about them was as great then as it is today.

A modern novelist makes one of his characters settle the first of them thus: "I notice that anyone at all out of proportion, or whose nose is on one side, or whose eyes jut out, or even have a shining look, always believes in a soul; people who are in proportion, and have no prominent features, don't seem to be really interested." The inference drawn is that "the soul is the result of loose gearing in the organism, a sort of special consciousness from not working in one piece." (Galsworthy: "*The White Monkey*.")

It would not be right to dismiss this as merely an attempt to make the holders of certain views look ridiculous. Psychical vagaries are often the accompaniments of physical distortions; and, in particular, cases of double personality do seem to arise from something in the nature of loose-gearing in the organism.

But it is not safe to argue from abnormalities; and no one who has studied the history of human thought will dismiss off-hand, as a psychical vagary, the belief that the soul has its own existence; nor is there any reason to suppose that those who have held this belief strongly have been, as a rule men who were not well put together. Plato, who supported it with all the power of which he was capable, combined mental acuteness with physical strength and comeliness in a remarkable degree.

His definition of soul as "the motion which moves itself" was evidently regarded by him as one of his most important contributions to philosophy. It is also one of the points on which Aristotle is most careful to dissociate himself from his master. It appears first in highly poetical language in the *Phædrus* (245 *e*) and is repeated with the more precise form of a philosophical argument in the Tenth Book of the *Laws* (see the very clear statement of Burnet, "Thales to Plato," p. 333). In the *Laws* it forms a part of his attempt to convince those who refuse to believe in God. He finds the cause of this unbelief in a materialistic view of the world and a wrong conception of soul as a subordinate accessory to body. Soul (*ψυχή*) for him covers all that we mean by life as well as soul. In epistemology Plato is frankly a dualist. There is no trace in him of the philosophy which says that "there is no being or fact outside of that which is commonly called psychical existence" (F. H. Bradley; see *Mind*, No. 133, p. 156). He recognizes two existences, bodies and souls. But he gives the priority to soul, which as the one self-moved mover, is the cause of all movements of bodies, inorganic as well as organic.

Plato had the gift of far-sighted philosophic vision, and there is much in his view which suggests those of modern physicists. He does not, indeed, anticipate them by completely resolving body into motion: but he would probably have recognized no essential difference between the internal motions of the atom and those of the animated cell. He would have regarded both as due to the same principle which is at work in the movements of conscious thought and in those of the heavenly bodies. All alike were for him the work of soul, and the world of soul (*τὰ ψυχῆς συγγενῆ*, *Laws* 892 *a*) included for him all those sides of life which man has developed in morals, politics, art and religion. He is particular about this point, and is evidently on his guard against reducing soul to a mere naked essence. It is worth while to quote one passage in full: "The soul then directs all things in heaven, and earth, and sea by her movements, and these are described by the terms will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion true and false, joy and sorrow, confidence, fear, hatred, contentment, and other primary motions akin to these; which again

receive the secondary motions of corporate substances, and guide all things to growth and decay, to composition and decomposition, and to the qualities that accompany them, such as heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness, blackness and whiteness, bitterness and sweetness, and all those other qualities which the soul uses, herself a goddess, when truly receiving the divine mind and disciplining all things rightly to their happiness" (Laws 896 *e*, ff, Jowett's translation. There is some doubt about the text of the concluding words of this passage, but its general drift is unmistakable). Aristotle lost sight of this aspect of Plato's philosophy, when he assumed that the World-Soul must consist only of *νοῦς* (De An. 407 *a* 3). Perhaps we may hazard a conjecture that Plato is here fighting the views of a critic—possibly Aristotle himself—who seemed to leave soul a mere blank, and whose philosophy had a tendency like that of those Jewish and Arabian Aristotelians who deprived God of all attributes (see Renan: Averroes, p. 42).

To Plato this was not a mere abstract or scholastic discussion. He started with strong religious and ethical convictions—in particular with the conviction that goodness in man is something real, that it corresponds to something no less real in the world of things, and that the best soul is that which is most closely in touch with the goodness in the kosmos (Epin. 988 *e* 2). Now goodness is something that belongs to the conscious life of souls, and this sort of reality is not likely to be ascribed to it except by those who believe that soul is something real in man, and that there is in the kosmos something of a kindred nature which responds to it.

Plato found the strongest confirmation of these views in the correspondence between the highest forms of intelligence in man and the mathematical principles which he saw at work in the universe, and above all in the heavenly bodies. Other things influenced him, which are less intelligible to the modern mind. He had learnt philosophy first from a Herakleitean, and he never abandoned the chief article of the creed of Herakleitos—that the universe is in perpetual motion and that it is motion that holds the whole together, as "porridge is held together by stirring" (Herakl. Fr. 84). It was a first principle among the Greeks generally, that like is known by like; and, though Plato avoided the crude applications of this principle which some of the early philosophers had made, he was attracted by the view that the mind, being itself motion, is naturally able to apprehend a universe which is in perpetual motion (Arist. De An. 405 *a* 28). The mind to which Herakleitos applied this principle was a material mind, though its matter was the finest which he could conceive. Plato went

on to apply the same principle to a mind which was wholly immaterial.

Was he justified in taking this step and in treating the motion of conscious thought as something of the same kind as the movement of material things? This brings us to Aristotle's criticism, much of which was directed to this point. It would not be suitable here to follow in detail the long array of arguments which he brings against the view that the soul either is motion or is in motion. A mind of such acuteness as his would be sure to find difficulties attaching to any statements whatever that might be made about such concepts as soul, body, and motion. But Aristotle's difficulties with regard to any doctrine which identified soul with motion are genuine, and must not be ignored. It seemed to him that the movements of conscious thought were something essentially different both from the movements of the heavenly bodies and from the life processes of animals and plants. He did not deny that conscious thought has reality of a kind, but he regarded it as something mysterious and divine (*θεωτέρον*, *De An.* 408 *b* 29), and felt that motion can be ascribed to it only by a metaphor. The modern reader may, at first sight, be inclined to agree with him. But is the criticism really sound? Does not this apparent difference of kind in the two movements arise from the fact that we have knowledge of motion from different points of view? There is first the purely inside point of view, when we are aware of it in the movement of our conscious thought. This, borrowing Prof. Alexander's terminology, we may call "enjoyed motion"—when that which is conscious of the motion is also that which is in motion. Next, there is the purely outside point of view, when we contemplate the life of animals and plants and the other movements of the universe. Lastly, we have the movements of our own bodies, which we may claim to know from both points of view, from the outside as contemplated, and from the inside as enjoyed. To Plato motion was something essentially the same in all these cases, and when he spoke of conscious thought in terms of motion, it was certainly no metaphor to him.

As to the question what conscious thought really is, we have very little data for an answer beyond what Plato and Aristotle had. Our acquaintance with the nervous system has given us clearer ideas than they had about the physiological happenings which accompany it. Modern psychology with the aid of hypnotism has tried to direct a searchlight into the region of the unconscious. But conscious thought itself we still only know from the inside as a moving process in which each of us is himself the mover. Unless, however, our whole conscious experience is an illusion, this activity of thought

can cause movements in our bodies, and exercises a partial control over those motions which constitute our physical life. What right has Aristotle to forbid us to regard this mental activity as motion? His arguments against it amount to very little. His method is to assume the validity of his own view of motion; and if that of his adversary leads to consequences inconsistent with this, he pronounces judgment against it. For him all motion must be motion in place; mental activities are not carried on in place, therefore they are not to be described as motion. For those who take a different view of motion the argument is of no value. (For remarks on Aristotle's inexhaustible supply of objections see Hicks's edition of the *De Anima*, p. 239.)

It has been said "that it is always easy to supply first principles when you have settled your conclusions" (Leslie Stephen; Hobbes, p. 34). There is much in the arguments both of Plato and Aristotle which need not be taken very seriously. In the case of Plato there is much which was never meant to be taken quite seriously as reasoning, and which was merely thrown out as a probable imagining, or intended (like the ten kinds of motion in the Tenth Book of the *Laws*) to add impressiveness to those conclusions which were his serious convictions. Aristotle's arguments were meant to be taken seriously, but are often based on data which we now know to be false; and where they are directed against an opponent, they sometimes seem to be captious objections. But the conclusions of both philosophers always deserve attention, and have often played an important part in the history of human thought. It is worth while to get a clear idea as to the difference between them.

It has been urged (Hicks *De An.*, p. xxxvi) that both philosophers agree in opposing materialism, that, "as compared with this point of agreement, the differences between them count for little"; and that, if Plato would talk of energy or activity of soul instead of movement, the two would be practically in agreement. But the difference between them goes deeper than that, and applies to their views not only of the soul but of the universe.

To Aristotle, in the case of soul, thinking is not motion but is rather that which arrests motion (*ἡρέμῃσις ἢ ἐπίστασις*, *De An.* 407 *a* 32). *Noûs* for him works like light, when it makes colours actually existent and visible (*ib.* 430 *a* 15); and it is worth noticing that he also denies the motion of light (*ib.* 418, *b* 21). The operations of perception, imagination and desire he defines indeed as motions, but in all these cases he is thinking of motions of the physical organs which accompany the mental happenings. The mental side of the happening

is passive receptivity. Mind in perception and imagination is pure form and nothing more. From this there seems to be only one step to the position that it is nothing at all, and no particular reason why we should not take that step, so long as our consideration is confined to the perceptive level of life, or to what we may perhaps call the biological soul. Aristotle's psychology makes the perceptive part of this complete in itself by providing it with a central organ of sense, working by movements of physical parts, and coordinating the data supplied by the five sense organs. There would be no difficulty, if we grant the existence of this central organ of sense, in supposing that the intellectual powers have been gradually developed from it. But Aristotle knows nothing of such evolutionary development. He had found fault with Empedocles for identifying intelligence with sense, and his system required a prominent place for *νοῦς* both in the soul and in the universe. But in both he leaves it rather loosely attached.

In the soul *νοῦς*, for him, is something divine which comes from outside (*θύραθεν*, Gen. An. II 3, 736 b 28). But this divine spark, from which, as we have seen, the light of reason radiates, is something which is in the soul, but not of it. It cannot blend with anything else; it can only cause bodily movements indirectly by the co-operation of desire, which is a movement of the physical organs. Even in our intellectual life all the content comes from sense and imagination. The intellect which receives this content is passive, and here, as in perception, mind is resolved into mere form. This passive intellect is perishable and comes to an end with the bodily activities to which it is attached. Its only permanence is in that continuous cycle of life which the organism maintains by reproduction. The active intelligence which came from outside, is separable from the organism and is eternal, but its permanence is that of "naked essence—incompetent of memory."

In the universe *νοῦς* in its supreme form is, for Aristotle, the unmoved mover, the great final cause towards which the activity of everything that moves is directed, and which causes all movements by setting to work in the mover something of the nature of desire. The two philosophers were agreed that the heavenly bodies are animated. In the *Laws* and the *Epinomis* this view is advocated with much earnestness. With regard to the sun Plato gives a choice of three possible views (*Laws* x, 898 c), either (1) the sun is animated by a soul which causes its motions in the same way in which our movements are caused by our souls, or (2) soul, working from outside, causes the movements by some bodily medium of the nature of fire or vapour, provided by herself for the purpose, or (3) a purely immaterial soul causes the move-

ments in a mysterious manner which cannot be described. W. Jaeger (*Aristoteles*, p. 144) thinks that the third of these views refers to Aristotle's conception of an unmoved mover, which as a final cause exercises an attraction in the same way as the object of love starts a motion in the heart of the lover. This ingenious conjecture may well be true. In any case the conception of the unmoved mover lies at the root of much of Aristotle's mature philosophy and marks a point of view that differs widely from that of Plato.

But it was not merely on the question whether the soul is to be defined as movement that the two philosophers had drifted asunder. It is impossible to read the passages in which Aristotle asserts positively that real existences (*οὐσίαι*) are, first and foremost, bodies (*De An.* 412 *a* 11. *Metaph.* IV ch. 8) without seeing in them an intentional contradiction of the view of soul put forward so earnestly in the 10th book of Plato's *Laws* and in the *Epinomis*. To soul he will only allow an *οὐσία κατὰ τὸν λόγον* or the reality of a scientific formula (*De An.* 412 *b* 10). When this was written, he had travelled far from the Platonic standpoint of his early dialogue on the Soul (*Rose Fr.* 39, 40, 41). His final definition of soul as "the first actuality of the living organism" (*De An.* 412 *a* 27), leaves us little more than a blank, and seems to have no kinship at all with Plato's view of soul as the stirring impulse not only in the individual organism, but in all the life and motion of the universe.

A third point, on which the criticisms of the *De Anima* are clearly directed against Plato, is the doctrine of the tripartite soul (*De An.*, 432 *b* 6). Here it may be said that neither Plato nor Aristotle intended to deny the essential unity of the soul, and that the only point at issue between them is the classification of the different faculties of a soul which is really one. It is not difficult to see that the question of parts or faculties of the soul was discussed in Plato's school during the later years of his life. In *Laws Bk.* 1, 644 *e* before introducing his comparison of the desires to the strings in a puppet-show, Plato is careful to insist that the man, as a whole, is one. Again in *Bk.* ix 860 *b* when he speaks of *θυμός* as either a *πάθος* or a *μέρος* of the soul, he seems to have in view criticisms like those of Aristotle.

Both would probably have agreed, not only in asserting the unity of the soul, but also in acknowledging it to be an imperfect unity. It is not easy to harmonise Aristotle's active intelligence with the other parts of the soul as described by him. It is an intrusive element, which has caused endless controversy among his interpreters. For Plato a more perfect unity is the goal which the soul hopes to attain in a higher

form of existence, when it is free from the multiplicity of the life of sensation (Epin. 986 *d* 3, 992 *b* 5 sqq). But the unity for which he hopes is clearly not that of an intelligence which has been purified into a naked essence, but that of thought which will still have a content, and will be occupied in contemplating the noblest objects. It may, no doubt, be urged that strict reasoning leaves it impossible that pure thought, detached from the life of sense, can have such a content as Plato's vision attaches to it; and Aristotle's views in his maturer works seem to have moved in this direction. His Jewish and Arabian commentators rigidly insisted on this bare and contentless thought. Some forms of modern realism have taken a similar direction, and eliminate all content as non-mental, reducing mind to a purely conative activity (see paper on a Conational Psychology by S. Alexander, *British Journal of Psychology*, Vol. IV, p. 239).

One other point, to which allusion has already been made, deserves a few more words. Philosophy must face the fact that a belief in the continuity of the soul's existence, either as attached to another organism, or in some purely spiritual form of being, is an act of faith. Plato combined both these beliefs, holding that the ultimate spiritual unity, described in Epin. 986 *d* is prepared for by a series of lives, in which the soul is attached to organic bodies. That he quite seriously held the doctrine of rebirths is proved by the impressive passage in Laws 903-905. This passage cannot be dismissed as mere mythology, though Plato himself would probably have been the first to allow that any attempt to describe the laws under which such rebirths take place, belongs to mythology and to mythology alone. In this form, the doctrine of the past and future existence of the soul has received a widespread and unquestioning belief among the greater part of the inhabitants of Asia for more than two millennia, and does not seem to be losing its hold. In Europe, even at the present time, it has not got over the effect of the caricatures to which it was exposed both in antiquity and in the centuries which followed the Renaissance. Aristotle in his mature work laughs at rebirths as Pythagorean fables (De An. 407 *d* 22). Hume, on the other hand, a man not specially inclined to credulity, after considering the various forms of the doctrine of immortality, gives his judgment that metempsychosis is "the only system of this kind that philosophy can hearken to" (Essay on Immortality); and there are not wanting indications that thought in Europe is coming round to this point of view.¹

¹ An interesting account of a *questionnaire* issued by the Society for Psychical Research on the question of immortality will be found in "Problems of Belief," by F. C. S. Schiller, pp. 58 ff. The answer to the *questionnaire* which the author singles out as "Ringing true" is that of a believer in rebirths.

COGITATIONES DE RE PEDAGOGIANA.

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II.

Ability is a much more varied and many-sided thing than is commonly imagined. One may be a talented scholar or a successful politician and yet not have sufficient ability to drive a motor-car without risk of decreasing the population of the country. A man who had occupied a position as Cabinet Minister with acknowledged success told me that, after vainly trying for four years to drive a car, he had abandoned the task to his sons, concluding that he himself was "too stupid or too something—whatever it was—to drive the car." He felt ashamed of himself; he could not avoid the consciousness of his inability. It is a matter of common experience that many of those accounted dull, or "fair average," at school have afterwards given proof of decided ability, both of a practical and intellectual kind. I have in mind two co-evals, one a successful bank-manager in a big town, the other a man who for his public services received a well-earned knighthood. The school—that is the masters *and the fellow-pupils*—accounted these two boys as slow, yet they have "distanced" most of those who were at school with them. The growing recognition of such facts has led educationists to attempt the construction of a school-life which shall be an epitome, somewhat idealised, of the great envisioning life of realities—or in other words to condense the essential activities of the great life into the compass of the smaller life of the school. The attempt is foredoomed to failure. Why? Because the school, however practical, appeals only to one part of the whole mind at a time, whereas in the great arena of life the whole mind is appealed to, though in any given effort or undertaking the appeal is apparently made only to one or two portions, say, the cognitive and the conative. In the real battle of life all the instincts are in play, all the elemental forces, all the old Adam—fear, jealousy, avarice, cunning and a thousand other qualities. Two people of equal ability under academic conditions are unequal under the conditions of the larger life, for here all the conscious and sub-conscious elements are at work. Fear operates but little in a normal educational environ-

ment; greed for money can also operate but little. But no sooner is a man thrown on the world, as it is called, than his ability is immediately multiplied, or divided, or both, by the other components of his whole nature. The sports field often provides a better occasion for character training and for observation of character than the class room, because courage, fear, love of applause, public attention provide stimuli, or deterrents, that not only arouse or thwart such ability as is present under class-room conditions, but bring into play entirely new and unsuspected elements. In the life-contest the desire to make or get money is the one desire that never seems to grow old; it is the universal urge that is stronger than the love of honour, which Pericles named as the only craving in man which never grows old. Clear-headedness in school is no sure guarantee of clear-headedness in the economic struggle. Conversely, thick-headedness in school is no guarantee of thick-headedness in the economic field. The effort to bring about, in the schools, a closer approximation to life-conditions is a laudable one. It met with great success for a time in "The Little Commonwealth" established by the unfortunate Homer Lane, who died recently in Paris of a broken heart. A smaller effort was made in a single class by J. H. Simpson in one of the great public schools of England. His method of providing a substitute for economic rewards (and punishments) is interestingly described in his book, "An Adventure in Education." Yet, after all, the fact remains that a substitute is not a reality—it has not the lure of financial gain, nor the depressing terrors of possible failure and loss. The truth appears to be that, despite all the glowing pictures of educational reformers, the school is, and must remain, a fenced-off section of life. At the same time, it is obvious that in all our school education abstract studies have played too large a part. The demand is for more practical studies, and this is a wise demand.

But when we look into this demand for practicality and follow it to its results, we are involved in difficulties that are inherent in human nature. School-pupils that qualify for scholarships in secondary schools of the academic type, are commonly looked upon, and look upon themselves, as superior mentally to those who are drafted into technical schools. Again, all men in their hearts regard manual labour as inferior to mental. They imply it by their actions, though they may never state it in words. When I was principal of a private school in Victoria, successful farmers frequently said to me: "I am sending my boy to get a good education and to pass matriculation, because I don't want him to work as I have had to work." Recently I took a vote in a class of education

students, about 120 in number, in the University, and they all admitted that somehow they felt that manual labour was inferior to intellectual. The reason appears to be that primitive man operates immediately on surrounding nature by his bodily efforts. Improved methods come slowly by the operation of experience, reason and investigation. Those incapable of the continued use of the higher faculties remain on the lower plane. Some pass into an intermediate stage, and so endless differentiation of activities takes place. The practical difficulty is before us at the present time. I am a member of a committee to revise the school syllabus in New Zealand: one of our objects is to achieve this very practicality. At the same time, we desire to open the road to the high school for all pupils from about twelve years of age upwards. Yet past experience shows that many will attempt the purely academic course who are unfitted for it: they will attempt it because their parents want it, because it is thought to be higher than the other courses, because it is more remote from work of the hands. The mental test may eventually do a great service in this field, if it can only achieve a higher prognostic value. At present its value in prediction is not very great even in the purely academic field. I have before me a number of American correlations between intelligence tests and subsequent scholastic success: almost all these correlations are below .50. Hence, their predictive value even in their own sheltered field is not high.

But even if general intelligence tests, achievement tests, and all the other varieties had a higher validity, the practical difficulty with human nature would still remain. The solution would appear to be some form of socialism or communism. Indeed, if we take any one social line of thought and follow it out with a view to establishing justice on earth, when each man, as in Plato's justice, shall do that which he is best fitted for, we come ultimately to communism. Then, when we have arrived there we find that despite our logic we have erred through following only one line of thought—whereas life is composed of multitudinous lines of thought and activity. For, when we arrive at the ideal commonwealth along one line, we find that we have ignored human self-reliance, surely one of the greatest factors in man's progress. The soviet schools, as far as I can gather from reliable articles in *Die Erziehung* (Leipzig), are confronted with these very difficulties. The soviet authorities must have specially trained scientific workers and leaders: hence, these must receive a special education that the masses cannot participate in; and so a communistic society, unless it is to remain of the primitive agricultural and pastoral type, inevitably engenders the very

types of character it has regarded as its enemies. If, in the modern world, any educator can show, and get others to believe and practise, that culture and manual labour, as these are ordinarily understood, are compatible not only with each other, but with the constant curiosity of man to find out new things, to keep alive old ones, and can prevail on the doctor, the engineer and the commercial king to rank himself with the wharf-labourer and the stone-breaker, if any educator can do that! But he cannot. There is not a secondary school in this land of Australia which does not, consciously or unconsciously, particularly in view of its examinations, administer the spur to its pupils by the implied assurance of "getting on in life," in other words of avoiding the curse pronounced in Genesis. Ruskin imagined education as, not for getting on in life, but for enabling us to stay happily where we are—a vain hope. Ruskin aspired to the skies, but he lived, like us all, in a terrene world, where men want the rewards they deem best.

A gradual lessening of strain is of course possible—is, indeed, with us. Part of the lessening of strain must be a revaluation of abilities, with its consequent reaction upon social prestige. Many a grocer is better educated than some University graduates. A constant reproval made against us (and I speak as one of the academic) is that we are unpractical, uncreative, too niggling and hypercritical in our views, because of the rarefied atmosphere we breathe. I sometimes wonder whether Bernard Shaw's ability is equal to that of Ford, the motor monarch. Shaw has the advantage in that he writes, and the written word remains. The big business men of antiquity in Rome and Alexandria are forgotten, while second-rate scribes like Callimachus and Persius linger on to plague students of literature. But Ford is now a scribe, doubtless having recognized the impermanence of cranks and self-starters, and being bent on immortality through his "works." Ford's works may one day have a different connotation from the present one, yet he has declared his contempt for the bookish education, not without some reason.

Nevertheless, there is growing up a wider and better brotherhood. Ultimately, this growing feeling is a religious one, at base Christian. The founder of Christianity exemplified both phases of life, the practical and the spiritual, in himself. One of the finest passages in "Sartor Resartus" is the depiction of this union of the two apparent incompatibles. But man is not divine, except in potentiality. He is a creature who cannot fast, and he is incensed if he feels his work is despised. To a teacher of any heart nothing is more poignantly sorrowful than to see the differentiation and estrangement amongst his old pupils after they leave his idealistic little

world, and pass into the world of market values and social snobbery.

New Zealand offers, I think, a fairer example of democracy than any other country. For instance, the government secondary schools, though practically free to all, have both an educational and social status together with a freedom from bureaucratic domination that cannot be found in any other part of the Empire. There is a value here put upon intellectual attainment as well as business success, but neither is unduly emphasized. There is a growing willingness to appreciate all forms of ability that conduce to public well-being. A steady growth of belief in harmonious development as an educational ideal is observable. Harmonious development looked at from inside the soul, so to speak, demands physical education, intellectual, artistic, social, moral and practical, creative education; all the great streams of energy and desire must be fed. Creative power has to be stimulated, but absorptive and appreciative longings in scholarship and æsthetics must not be neglected. Again, no human race is so low but it has a dim conception of the "not ourselves," be it only of a spirit of the tribe, *mana*, or a totem, or some other symbol. It seems to me that education without religion can never produce harmonious development. Religion will come back into the schools, because it is an instinct. The principle of tropism has been applied to explain human actions. If it is a sound principle, let it be applied over the whole field of instincts. If man is phototropic broto- (food) and pototropic, he is also theotropic. "*Fecisti nos ad Te, et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in Te.*" St. Augustine's words are true. Behind all the satisfaction over scientific achievements lies the restless yearning of the inner mind for reality and truth. The outbreak of spiritualism in our own day among men of eminent talents need not be ascribed to a longing for magic or to a morbid craving for apports and ectoplasm. It may rather be ascribed to the continual claim from the inner life for an association with the intuitively apprehended source of all mental action. The Earl of Balfour in a recent essay says, "No man really supposes that personally he is nothing more than a changing group of electrical charges, so distributed that their relative motions enable or compel them in their collective capacity to will, to hope, to love, to think, perhaps to discuss themselves as a physical multiplicity, certainly to treat themselves as a mental unity. No creed of this kind can ever be extracted by valid reasoning from the sort of data which the physics of the present or the future can possibly supply." This is why I should welcome the general appearance of religious teaching, however broad and simple, in our schools. There is a distinct

probability that the *Religious Exercises in Schools Bill* will pass in New Zealand. I hope it will. Religion in its everyday aspect ought to enable men to respect all types of ability, even if men persist, as I think they will, in attaching their own values to the differences that are due to Nature. Greek days, the great Greek days—and luckily educators are turning back to these more and more for inspiration—offer us a picture of an attempted harmonious education. From the thinkers of those days we can learn the spirit of tolerant inquiry and belief. We can learn from Plato the noble conception of Deity pure, unchanging, just and holy. But we have an addition to that, a humanity that was not possible then. Though in this dim spot called earth we are faced with difficulties that can never be completely solved because of man's creative and change-seeking nature, we can, through an education from the beginning that attempts a revolution of human efforts, mitigate the asperities and rancours that afflict the present age. The only spirit that can do this is the religious spirit. It failed to do it in the past, and led to wars, persecutions and intolerance. But man's conscience has evolved, if his intellect has not, since then. The world-war was the first occasion when almost the whole of the planet's inhabitants participated in the one struggle. They may yet participate in the one cooperation. Every teacher who can make his pupils feel that all forms of work demand ability, and that all occupations are worthy of respect, is a contributor to world-peace. The soviet schools, despite the vilification heaped on them, will contribute a valuable experience to the world. We must not disdain to learn of them, even if they are avowedly irreligious. Religion, presented in the new light of science, of Biblical knowledge, psychology and human interdependence, demands its place in harmonious development. It will not solve all our difficulties, but it will enable men to live together peaceably. If that is too much to expect, it would at least bring a centre of peace to each life. *Sunt lacrimæ rerum*—tears to human suffering are due; but mortal hopes defeated and o'erthrown are not mourned. Rather in the reality of the religious life are they gathered up for a realisation that is yet to be. The reading manual for religious education that I have in view is a wide one—too wide to come into use at present. I should choose extracts from the Wycliffe, Douay, and Revised Version Bibles; also extracts representative of what is great and permanent in Mohammedanism and other oriental beliefs; prayers from Homer, Vergil and Lucretius; an extract or two from Marcus Aurelius; the song of praise from Epictetus beginning "Great is God"; and especially extracts from Plato, including the prayer of Socrates from the conclusion of the *Phædrus*:—

"O beloved Pan and all ye other gods of this place, grant to me that I may become beautiful in my soul within, and that all those things which I possess outwardly may be in harmony with those within. May I consider the wise man rich. And may my share of worldly goods be such as only the self-restrained man can bear or endure." The spirit of inspiration has not descended on one race of men only. The many-coloured dome of life has stained the white radiance of eternity. The gathering together of the lights may result in one light. Man must live as a practical working and eating animal. Education must provide for that. Manual work and cookery should be taught thoroughly at some stage in education, side by side with the academic subjects. But there must be the other food, that for the hungry spirit. *Patres vestri ederunt manna in deserto, et mortui sunt.*

But all those constituents ministered educationally to the living soul in disconnected series—religious, social, creative, æsthetic, intellectual, physical—cannot ensure harmonious development. An individual life becomes a unity with all its powers according well when it exteriorises its own best essence, gives it an imagined reality, sets up this reality as an all-pervading stimulus in the environment, and re-establishes it also as a propulsive force within. In other words, harmonious development becomes a reality when it rises to ideality. I take it that every responsibly-situated person connected with education wakes each morning to the vision of his uranian city—or, if not that, that he feels the propulsion onward to the haven desired. In schools this may materialise as The League of Nations, or it may be a co-operative world, supplanting a competitive one; but by whatever name it is called, it will be a *Civitas Dei*. Without some principle such as this there is no harmonious development. Nature that made us of so many elements warring within our breasts for mastery,

Doth teach us all to have aspiring minds:
Our souls whose faculties can comprehend
The wondrous architecture of the world
And measure every planet's wandering course,
Still climbing after knowledge infinite,
And always moving as the restless spheres,
Will us to wear ourselves, and never rest.

Marlowe's reverberating lines have the import for education that though man biologically is grounded in the dust and the products thereof, his creative self is in its hope beyond time and place.

DISCUSSION.

ON PROFESSOR H. T. LOVELL'S ARTICLE, "THE CONCEPT OF VALUE FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW."¹

By A. SMITH,
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WITH the general tenor of the article—that values do not depend upon our explicit consciousness of them—most of us would agree. I would like, however, to draw attention to several minor matters connected with Professor Lovell's exposition.

Firstly, he says: ". . . the value of objects, events, states of being, is not determined by us, but for us by our dispositions." Is it legitimate to draw a distinction in this way between "by" and "for"? "Determined for us" means determined for the self, and an action determined *for* the self is determined by something other than the self. If a student's course of studies is determined for him by the Senate, then we can clearly see that this is an instance (I hope a fair one) of one body, the Senate, determining certain responses on the part of another body, the student. This is what Professor Lovell appears to mean: that one thing, the disposition, determines the action of another thing, the self. But are the innate dispositions other than the self? Modern psychological theory—James, Stout, McDougall—takes the view that the self is not other than these innate dispositions, but on the other hand, consists of them, not in their simple comparatively unrelated form, but integrated, sublimated, repressed, controlled, according to innate neural capacity on the one hand, and training on the other.

But even in the earliest stages of organic life, is there such a thing as an absolutely unrelated response? Is there not always a self, and not a mere concatenation of unconnected modes of response? Consider the example of a man-eating tiger, bearing in mind that the tiger is a relatively advanced product of evolution. I doubt whether we would be

¹ *Vide* Vol. IV, 3.

justified in saying that a tiger is not responsible for the deaths he causes. The killing is done by him, not for him by his self-preserved instinct. It is the nature of the tiger to kill other animals, and this nature is to a certain degree unitary. We do not catch the tiger and try to eradicate his killing instinct; even to a tiger brought up in captivity we do not allow the same freedom as to the herbivorous horse. Although the tiger may to a certain extent be spoken of as possessing a number of relatively disparate "selves," yet those selves are all parts of the one animal; indeed the very word "possessing" implies a thinghood or substantiality which is by no means an artifact. The self-hood of the tiger differs from that of the man not in kind but only in degree. There is at all stages a self-reference of every act, even of the most mechanical of bodily processes, that is, insofar as they are accompanied by feeling. The feeling is that which makes it *my* act rather than somebody else's.

I doubt then whether we can use the word "for" in the sense in which Professor Lovell has used it. If an organism performs any action, that action is undoubtedly done *by* him. What the writer intended to stress was that the instinctive action was determined, the moral action (that performed by the highly developed self) free. But to state the issue in these terms does not invalidate the foregoing discussion, for the most mechanical organic response, insofar as it is organic, is not unmodifiable, *i.e.*, it contains the germ of freedom, while the "free" moral act is not free in the sense of being capricious or unmotivated, but only as implying the conscious direction of impulses already present. Here again, the difference between the "free" act of a moral man and the "determined" act of a brute is one of degree only, and we are no more justified in using the words "free" and "determined" than we are in using the words "by" and "for." If in the brutes there were no freedom whatsoever, if all their actions were completely determined "for" them by chemical reactions, tropisms, and other apparently purely automatic means, then it would be extremely difficult to understand how at any point in a continuous evolution freedom could enter, and how actions done "by" an organism could possibly come to pass. It would seem—and this now touches on the larger question of causality in general—that if there is freedom in man, there must always have been freedom, and ultimately, that even the apparently most rigid of Nature's laws are subject to change.

Secondly, Professor Lovell deals in a rather unsatisfactory manner with feeling. "Feeling," he says, "is the touchstone of value," meaning that pleasurable feeling determines whether an object shall be valued, and unpleasant feeling

whether it shall be avoided. This seems incontrovertible, but I can nowhere find an account of why it should be so. Perhaps the writer did not intend to account for it, and if so, I can only apologize for having misunderstood him. He makes a general statement regarding evolution of reactions by natural selection, but does not explicitly apply it to feeling. Now this is the crux of his article. If feeling is responsible for pre-human and even human valuations, then the origin and nature of feeling is surely the vital point of the argument. Can we explain the development of feeling by such principles as natural selection and transmission of acquired characteristics?

Suppose the first organism found itself confronted with a particle of substance, and suppose that it had had no previous experience whatsoever. How would it act? (1) If it had no feelings of pleasantness or unpleasantness, it might either (i) absorb the particle or (ii) remain indifferent to its presence. If it absorbed the particle what was the motive that impelled it to do so? If there was no motive, the inference is, action without psychological determination, that is, action determined mechanically, and the result of this is epiphenomenalism. If, though, there was a motive impelling it to absorb the particle then that motive was prior to feeling, and the latter loses its alleged primacy in psychical life. If (ii) the organism remained indifferent to the particle, and if it remain indifferent to all particles, it would either remain motionless, which no organism does, or die from lack of energy to replace the energy lost by motion. This second alternative is thus ruled out.

(2) Now, on the other hand, if the first organism did possess feelings, contact with a particle of substance would arouse some feeling, and the substance would be valued accordingly. Then, by elimination of those organisms that reacted pleasurably to harmful stimuli, and by the transmission of acquired feeling reactions where painful experiences did not result in death, we would get a scheme of evolution in which values, consciously or unconsciously pursued, would play an important part, and in which only those organisms that valued things correctly would find a place. This second alternative is often accepted, but it is vitiated by its failure to give an account of the genesis of feeling. The fundamental problem seems to me to be this: Is feeling peculiar to organisms, or is it present in ever so small intensity in all chemical substances? We have no means of proving the latter, while the former is unsatisfactory since it does not enable us to explain why one particular stimulus should originally excite pleasant, and another, painful, feel-

ings. If feelings cannot be explained in other terms, *e.g.*, as accompanying excess of anabolism over katabolism, or, as accompanying the achievement of ends, *etc.*, then there is no reason why pleasure and pain should not replace each other, and pain determine appetite and pleasure, aversion.

REPLY BY PROFESSOR LOVELL.

"THE value of objects, events, states of being, is not determined by us, but for us by our dispositions." Is it, Mr. Smith asks, legitimate to draw a distinction in this way between "by" and "for"? It would seem not only legitimate but necessary so to do. The necessity arises, so it seems to the psychologist (and it was from the psychological point of view that one wrote), from the compulsion of fact. For the psychologist, generalizations about the self must issue from observation. What support, then, is to be found in fact for our distinction between what is determined by us and what is determined for us?

First, there is the fact of dissociation as evinced in pathological cases. Of such cases, a compulsion neurosis provides perhaps the best example. Some experience of the nature of a moral misdemeanour has been repressed incontinently, *i.e.*, without being assimilated by honest judgment into the integrated self. The moral misdemeanour has not been finally dealt with by reason, and is left to exist as an active emotional factor, divorced by instinctive repression from the rationally ordered self. If, now, it can be shown that such a repressed and dissociated emotional experience can determine thought, feeling, or action in spite of the rationally ordered self, then, in such a case at least, it would seem that thought, feeling, or action has been determined for the self and not by the self. The patient who is the subject of this particular compulsion neurosis, for example, is for ever compelled to be washing his hands. He says (his self knows) that the action is foolish. He does not even wish to perform the act, but he (his self) cannot resist. In point of fact, the repressed experience, not the integrated self, is said to be the determinant of this peculiar act, which is explained by the psychiatrist as a symbol of moral uncleanness. The self of the patient does not realize the source of determination until informed of it; and that realization, if followed by reintegration of the dissociated experience, will result in the disappearance of the obsession. In the case of such a patient, at least, it would seem that action is determined for the self and not by the self.

Secondly, it is to be noted that the determination may issue from structural dispositions, native or acquired. The question which arises here is whether structural dispositions constitute the real self. If they do not, and in so far as they do not, the thoughts, feelings and actions to which they prompt will be determined for the real self and not by the real self. And is there not good reason for saying that the structural dispositions are not the real self which is presented to one as a vigilant, consciously attentive, judging process? It would seem proper to draw a distinction between the self as content and the self as conscious process. As content the self consists of structural dispositions—habits of thought, feeling and action, as conscious process it is that activity which thinks, reasons, estimates, manipulates meaning and evinces insight. There seems no doubt that the self as conscious process by no means originates all our thoughts, feelings and actions. Whenever these are determined by structural dispositions without full knowledge of the self as conscious process, then the self is having its thoughts, feelings and actions determined for it; and this happens whenever men do not know clearly the source of their thoughts or the motives of their actions.

Regarding the second point raised about the priority of feeling, the assumption that feeling is primary was due merely to a personal point of view. It seems to the writer a question difficult to settle, and being unable to prove his assumption he asks to be allowed to make it without having to defend it as something demonstrable.

A CORRECTION.

WE regret that in the March issue errors occurred in the numbering of the figures on p. 39 of Dr. Bostock's valuable article, "The Dream in the Light of a New Conception of Consciousness." Fig. one should read 3, two should read 4, three should read 5, five should read 2 and four should read 1.—THE EDITOR.

RESEARCHES AND REPORTS.

ASSEMBLING MATCHES: A SIMPLE MANU-MOTOR TEST.¹

By E. RONALD WALKER, B.A.,

AND

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THE test here described measures hand and finger co-ordination, such as is demanded in occupations involving the assembly or handling of small objects. The simplicity of the test in both procedure and in the material required commends it.

For some time the test has been familiar to students at the Sydney Laboratory, and it was used in conjunction with other tests, by Martin, Doig and Simmat in an investigation in vocational psychology applied to engineering.² Muscio used a somewhat similar test in an investigation of motor types at the National Institute of Industrial Psychology in 1922,³ while Kemble has used rather different matches tests in vocational selection in America.⁴

It has been used in clinical work with sub-normal subjects at the Sydney Laboratory. A markedly improved performance on a second attempt at the test has been taken as significant of an ability to learn or acquire a simple motor process.

Hitherto, however, norms had not been obtained. This report will describe the test and an investigation directed towards securing age averages.

The essential material consists of a box of ordinary wooden matches, but for convenience boards are desirable upon which the matches may be laid out.

The boards used were about twelve inches square and half an inch thick, and were faced on one side with grey cardboard. Upon the cardboard was drawn a plan for three rows of ten matches each, the rows being parallel, and one inch apart, and the matches within each row parallel, and half an

¹Thanks are due to Dr. A. H. Martin, who suggested the work and aided us with valuable criticism and advice, to the Director of Education for permission to enter the schools, and to Mr. Inspector Black and members of school staffs for their willing co-operation.

²This Journal, Vol. III, No. 1.

³*Brit. Journ. of Psych.*, Vol. XIII, p. 160.

⁴"Selecting Employees by Test."

inch apart. Small dots marked where the heads of matches should be placed, a line designating the position of the stick. The plan was arranged so that the heads of the matches would be in alternating order, one up, the next down. A practice board was similarly prepared, but it was smaller, allowing for two rows of five matches each. Care was taken that the tray of the matchbox moved easily in the holder and it was marked clearly at three-fifths its length so that the box could always be opened to the same extent. Only sound and straight matches were used.

The Subject was seated at a table with the practice board before him. The height of his seat was always regulated so that he could conveniently perform the task. The matches were previously laid out on the practice and test boards. S. was given the matchbox, three-fifths open, and was shown how to hold it in the hollow of the left hand so that he could close it easily and quickly with the left forefinger. S. practised shutting the box three times. Instructions were then given as follows:

"When I say 'Go!' you are to pick up the matches off the board, one at a time, and place them in the box, so that all the heads are at the open end of the box. You are to commence at the end of the row nearest you, go along it, taking up one match at a time and putting it into the box, and not to skip any. Then go on to the second row in the same way. As soon as you have placed all the matches in the box, shut it, the way I showed you, as quickly as possible." The caution "Ready—" is given two seconds before the word "Go!"

The function of the practice trial was to familiarize S. with the task and to afford an opportunity to correct faults in procedure or errors in comprehending the instructions. A rest of half a minute was allowed, the time being occupied in exchanging the test board for the practice board. S. was then reminded of the details of his task, and the procedure carried through again. The time for placing the thirty matches in and shutting the box was taken to the nearest second by means of a stop watch, and the time occupied constituted the score.

Age averages were obtained after examination of 1,156 children of ages ranging from five to fifteen years. Of these 577 were boys and 579 girls, all drawn from several primary and secondary schools around Sydney.

Table I shows the number of children tested for each age, the age averages (time in seconds) with standard deviations for boys and girls separately and together. It will be seen that only 49 children of five years were tested. This is because it was seen that the deviations from the norm would be so great that it was not worth while continuing further with such

young children. Difficulty was found in administering the test to them and we do not consider it suitable to children below six years.

TABLE I.

Age.	Boys.			Girls.			Both.	
	No. Tested.	Score Average.	S.D.	No. Tested.	Score Average.	S.D.	No. Tested.	Score Average.
5	26	142	33	23	149	49	49	145
6	55	110	20.9	54	117	29	109	113
7	56	93	20	56	91	15.59	112	92
8	61	74	16	58	80	18.38	117	77
9	57	67	12.33	63	70	15.33	120	68
10	57	61	11.75	59	60	10.39	116	60
11	61	58	8	57	57	9.43	118	58
12	59	57	10.49	60	53	9.85	119	54
13	51	55	10.91	52	54	9.11	103	55
14	53	53	8	47	52	9.49	100	52
15	41	51	6.57	52	48	10.1	93	49
Total 577				Total 579			Total 1,156	

The average times decrease gradually and consistently with age, with one exception. The curve of growth for this form of ability tends to flatten out in the higher years and is similar in form to that of general mental growth. The normal time for thirteen years is greater than that for twelve years. At this point of the curve of growth we have a reversion. This is due, however, to the results for girls only and is not present in the case of the boys. We would suggest that the explanation of this is to be sought in the effects of the onset of puberty in the girls. If such effects became obvious in the boys we should look for it a couple of years later in the curve of growth.

The ogive distributions, based on Table II, allow the decile in which an individual may be located to be read at a glance. A comparison of his score with the averages of other ages permits of a "mental age" being found for him in this ability, and thus conclusions may be drawn as to his retardation or advancement from normal in this motor ability.

An attempt was made to compare success in this test with social status. Children from an industrial area were found to be slightly superior to children from a residential area up to an age of nine or ten years but the overlap of distributions is so great that we hesitate to draw any conclusions from it.

In each case tested, the parent's occupation was recorded. These occupations were classified into five classes: Unskilled,

TABLE II.

Scores in Seconds.	Ages.									
	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
35 to 31						1	7	5	4	3
40 to 36						6	13	11	20	12
45 to 41				2	3	16	25	23	26	17
50 to 46				3	12	24	30	18	23	24
55 to 51			8	15	22	26	19	20	15	17
60 to 56			11	17	17	24	12	10	5	9
65 to 61		3	12	18	27	24	12	8	3	7
70 to 66	2	9	22	13	18	10	5	4	1	2
75 to 71	3	8	14	19	5	9		4	1	1
80 to 76	4	10	13	11	7			4	3	1
85 to 81	4	14	9	8		1	1			
90 to 86	4	21	7	7	1	1	3			
95 to 91	12	16	4	3	2					
100 to 96	11	5	5	3	1					
105 to 101	10	2	3	1	1					
110 to 106	7	9	3							
115 to 111	7	5	1							
120 to 116	8	4	2							
125 to 121	9	1								
130 to 126	5	3	3							
135 to 131	3	2								
140 to 136	5									
145 to 141	7									
150 to 146	3									
Over 155	4									


skilled labour, expert technical work, clerical, etc., professional and better paid business work. Our divisions were necessarily arbitrary, but it was thought that if one such class were superior in any trait to another class, then that superiority should be evident in more than one age, and there might be expected a fair correlation between the relative performances of these classes at different ages.

Taking the years 9, 10, 11 and 12 as typical samplings, the average time for each occupational group was determined for each age. These averages were ranked within their respective ages and the rankings for the various ages were correlated. The results, however, are entirely negative. Table III shows the coefficients of correlation of one year with another.

TABLE III.

Between the ages of	Boys.	Girls.
	R =	R =
9 and 10	— .70	+ .97
10 and 11	+ .78	— .32
11 and 12	+ .38	+ .80
9 and 11	— .78	— .40
10 and 12	+ .83	— .81
9 and 12	— .58	— .60

DECILE AGE CURVE FOR ASSEMBLING MATCH TEST.

Score in
Seconds

THE FIGURES PRINTED ON THE CURVES REPRESENT
THE AGES OF THE INDIVIDUALS.

There are seven negative and five positive correlations. Four of the latter five denote a high degree of correlation, but to prove the existence of occupational differences as reflected in the heredity of children requires fairly high positive correlations throughout the twelve comparisons. From this investigation we have no evidence that this ability is not distributed generally throughout various social classes, and is therefore unlike general intelligence in this respect.

The test has been given for some years to the Second Year Psychology Class at the University of Sydney, their average time being 36.5 seconds.

In Martin, Simmat and Doig's investigation the average time for engineering apprentices was 33.6 seconds, which is faster than that for university students. This would indicate the importance of the ability in motor manual occupations.

REVIEW ARTICLE.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. By Professor L. D. White, University of Chicago. Pp. 495 + xiii. Macmillan and Co., 1926.

"Where the well-being of our fellow-men is concerned," wrote A. E. Zimmern in "Nationality and Government," "it is not enough to be well-meaning. Government is an art, not an inspiration." An excellent precept, only our practice is defiantly different. "The never-ending audacity of elected persons" is fostered by the belief that mere election works a magical change which enables the veriest tyro to assume all the responsibilities of legislation. For the onerous tasks of administration many still agree with President Andrew Jackson that "the duties of all public officers are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance." Professor White's interesting book sharply assaults both these positions, although he prosecutes his main attack upon the latter. His book is noteworthy, too, for another reason. It is, so far as the writer is aware, the first systematic treatise upon the art of government. Professors of Political Science have been content hitherto to deal with the problems of government from the standpoint either of the constitutionalist or the lawyer, relegating the administrative services to a casual chapter. This book conceives of Public Administration as "the management of men and materials in the accomplishment of the purposes of the State," and its objective as "the most efficient utilisation of the resources at the disposal of officials and employees." It is based upon American experience, but the principles enunciated transcend parochial boundaries and are capable of universal application. Especially interesting will Australian students find the discussion of the administrative relations between Federal, State and local authorities. The abundant evidence adduced that "on a national scale the march towards Washington, which goes on without interruption, is now stirring lively protests on behalf of State rights" will cheer Messrs. Bruce and Lang.

Before we proceed further, it will be fitting to notice Professor White's plan of treatment of his subject. Opening with some considerations of the scope and nature of administration in the modern State, which effectively refute the belief that anyone can discharge these duties, he passes to a discussion of the relationships between the public service and the political machine. Several chapters are then devoted to an examination of the administrative system, with its problems of centralization and integration, of political *versus* expert control, and of the best means of securing the continuous pressure of public opinion. The succeeding eight chapters deal with various aspects of the personnel problem, including recruitment, morale, classification and remuneration, promotion, discipline, and retirement. Other chapters deal with associations of public servants, the promulgation of administrative rules and regulations, control of administration, and finally with trends of modern administration.

Even in a review article, it is impossible to deal adequately with the many questions which clamour for consideration. We select the following and express a hope that readers will study this book for themselves.

A little more than a generation ago, writers on political science taught that as civilization advanced, less of the work of administration would be performed by the State, and more by voluntary associations. Voluntary organizations abound today and their proper place

in a national economy has yet to be explored, but it is clear that with the growth of democratic inclinations, demands for State intervention, regulation and control have multiplied rather than lessened. Hence arises the existing interest in administration which issues in repeatedly overhauling the machinery. Our administrative system grew out of comparatively simple conditions. Government was narrowly circumscribed. Relatively few public servants were required, and their behests were easily comprehended by plain people. Today the State penetrates into the most intimate of human relationships. Is the old machinery and are the former methods satisfactory? Must not centralized administration with its imperative command and rigidly uniform application give way to a consideration of the variable and sensitive human elements which have to be persuaded to co-operate in attaining the general well-being? Will not this mean fostering an administrative organization whose agents will have a sympathetic and personal contact with local and individual conditions? At once we are launched upon the controversy between centralized and decentralized administration. In America, in contradistinction to Australian experience, the initial stages of national growth were marked by excessive decentralization. "The State yielded to the county, the county gave way to the town and the town bowed to the districts." Recently the advance towards centralization has begun all along the line. "Education, penal institutions, charitable institutions, police, taxation, public utilities, local finance, highway construction, and regulation of the professions are the field which have felt the impact most . . . but hardly a phase of State or local activity has remained untouched." Professor White attributes the transformation in large part to economic conditions. Commercial, industrial and financial concerns have become integrated, and as a result "the range of social organization has spread far beyond the boundary lines of town, city or county, and then far across the boundaries of States . . . The range of administration was obliged to expand in like measure."

The ambit of the central authority extends from those measures which prescribe the least to those which impose the greatest degree of central control. For example, the central authorities may be content with giving advice, or they may assist financially conditional upon their being satisfied with the standard of local effort, or they may insist upon discharging a particular function themselves. The practical effect and the possible development of this control will vary directly with the "state of public opinion, the degree of resistance of local authorities, and the persistence of central officials." In Australia, public opinion is plastic, as the various referenda have indicated, State rights hold the field in State political and administrative circles, but the Federal authorities are persistent, and their financial superiority will probably secure them administrative supremacy, *cf.* Federal Public Health and Main Roads policy. Professor White is not unaware of the magnitude of the problems which this tendency raises. Will the central officials be competent to adapt the statutes, regulations and machinery to their human ends? Will they recognize the necessity for and foster local initiative? Will they become fatally enmeshed in red tape? Indeed, one of the prime reasons for the rejection of the recent referenda was a vivid apprehension of these things. And it was also felt that if the Federal authorities became oppressed with the administrative details of innumerable domestic questions, they would lose their vision and appreciation of Australia's external responsibilities. Professor White holds that a most important consideration is the effectiveness of an autonomous local administration as a training school in self-government. Finally, there is in his opinion an untouched field of investigation in the subject of administrative areas. "The

authority responsible for the demarcation of areas, the principles observed, the methods employed, the stability of the administrative map, the interrelations of areas, their connection with physical as well as social conditions need to be revealed." The writer cordially agrees with the urgent necessity for such an investigation. In England, in 1925, the Summer Conference of the Institute of Public Administration was devoted to some aspects of the problem. For a year the New State Commission in New South Wales hopelessly explored other avenues. With Professor White we must realize that the "process of centralization raises issues of the greatest importance quite outside the relatively narrow field of governmental efficiency," and these will be probably the determining factors. "It involves a consideration of the nature of the Federal power and the possibilities for further expansion, the difficulty of legislating by indirection, the question of legislative and administrative areas, the determination of what interests are essentially national and what matters can be more advantageously handled by local units of government, and the effects of centralization upon the relations of the people to their government." (W. Thompson: "Federal Centralization," p. 350.) In the process of centralization, saturation point is reached at different stages. Professor White suggests three standards of limitation: "The effective attainment of prevailing social ideals and objectives, the preservation of community and individual sense of initiative and responsibility, and the preservation of adequate democratic control." Australian public opinion has scarcely become conscious of these things. Our Constitutions are a blend of English and American models, our administrative traditions are almost wholly English. In the writer's opinion, we would do well to go to school for instruction in administration with England and Prussia. The *Greater Brisbane Act* embodies something of both systems, but we must extend the principles to State and Federal relationships. Nothing, for example, is more irritating to the ordinary citizen than our present distribution of governmental activities between the various authorities, Federal, State and Municipal, in addition to which we have a flourishing crop of quasi-autonomous *ad hoc* Commissions. Taxation, health, electoral franchise, roads, and arbitration amply illustrate. In a typical country town will be found officials of each authority pursuing their activities with little co-operation. If we consulted the convenience of citizens instead of the prestige of departments, we might devise a system which would combine all these activities under the control of a single responsible official, as in Prussia. Perhaps the burden of rising costs, and the pressure from Canberra may help us to revise our excessive departmentalization, and discover the true place of local government units.

Here the problem shades into one of integration, which Professor White discusses at pp. 103 to 163. Apparently, the trend of American policy since the war has been to amalgamate the host of separate Bureaux and Commissions into between ten and twenty departments controlled by popularly elected executives responsible to the Governor. The illustrations from Illinois of which the Professor has first-hand knowledge, are conclusive of the resulting efficiency and economy, but there are very definite limits to integration. The principal one is the effective control by a Minister over a widely ramified department. In the realm of city administration, the same tendency is manifest. The Commission system and the City Manager plan have each tended to concentrate responsibility in few hands and to amalgamate the congeries of municipal departments which had grown up under the old régime. But it must be remembered that American problems here become differentiated from our own by their retention of the plan of directly electing persons to executive control. Our scheme of Ministerial responsibility frankly recognizes that the Minister is not

an administrator, although some imagine they are. With us, the Minister's job is principally to act as a liaison between Parliament and the public on the one hand, and the departments on the other. There are weaknesses in this scheme, but it succeeds because of the reliance placed upon permanent officials. It escapes the fatal defect of the American plan which falsely claims to be able to elect experts. Nevertheless, the growth of public opinion sedulously informed by the devoted efforts of voluntary administrative research bureaux and cultivated in many universities by able Professors of Public Administration has wrought a marked advance in the last decade. The chief instruments in the hands of Governors in various States, and of the President in the Federal arena, have been the Bureaux of the Budget, and the Personnel Commissions. The former, which have high prestige, have co-ordinated the financial arrangements of the departments and the latter have effected marked improvements in the recruitment and classification of staffs. In the Federal administration, the reorganization of departments and the insistence upon merit in the personnel have effected savings in recent years which range from "\$100,000,000 to \$500,000,000 according to the optimism of the calculator."

In the face of the repeated onslaughts of Efficiency and Economy Commissions, the Jacksonian doctrine of Spoils to the Victors is gradually giving way. The Eighteenth Amendment (the *Volstead Act*) has thrown the issue into vivid relief. Whatever the wisdom of the Act, the political administration of the prohibition system has been responsible for appalling corruption. According to Professor White, the issue has now shifted from policy to administration, and efforts are being made to secure the selection of prohibition agents upon the basis of merit instead of party affiliation.

In America, as in Australia, the rising salary scales, the immense increases in the number of employees, and the suspected quality of the services rendered have focussed attention upon the problem of management as the major question in government today. Where government touches almost every activity of life, it is irritating if that contact is inefficient, it is intolerable if it is also excessively expensive. In America, it is estimated that there are 4,000,000 public employees, despite its reputed individualism. Collectivist Australia has about the same proportion, although statistics are extremely hard to obtain. How are these servants to be recruited, controlled, remunerated, and trained? What political affiliations shall be permitted? It would appear that experience on both sides of the Pacific establishes the conclusion that in those services where public service unionism is closely allied to political parties, efficiency is at a discount and costs at a premium. Australia nominally follows the British tradition which discourages active participation of public servants in politics, although there are not wanting signs that this tradition is being departed from. It is significant that America is attempting to eliminate the evil of party politics after having had a full experience of both the British system and the Jacksonian policy. Recruitment by competitive examinations is one method of achieving this end, but this is not sufficient. Remuneration and promotion must also be made dependent upon merit. This is a counsel of perfection which is nowhere completely attained. In Australia we are still far from the goal, though we are further on the road than in U.S.A. Professor White is emphatic that "the influence exerted by political appointees has been baneful" and particularly destructive of the morale of the service.

Public Service Commissions are to be found in all spheres of American government, though some States still scorn their services. The Commissions are nearly always the creatures of the State Governors or the Mayors of cities, who, being themselves party representatives, are prone to lean to supporters. Statutory provision has

attempted to secure bi-partisan representation, instead of non-partisan. Usually, not more than two of the three members may belong to the same party, and the term of office varies from three to six years. Their powers differ from place to place. In some, they are merely examining bodies, as in England, in others they possess something of the additional powers of management exercised by the New South Wales and the Commonwealth Public Service Boards. Professor White says they are "the centre of an enormous amount of pressure . . . and their task . . . becomes almost impossible at times." The National Municipal League (U.S.A.) has been urging that the Commissions should be entirely independent of political control, and that to secure initial impartiality, the Commissions should themselves be selected by competitive examinations. The writer, with a long experience of competitive public service examinations, trembles at the prospect of thus securing Managers. If the Commissions are to be mere examining bodies, the position is different. It is conceivable that the function of public service management may centre in the Bureau of the Budget. In this, there are strong possibilities, as the staff managers should be in close contact with the supreme financial authority. This seems to rule out the attempt to separate the Commissions from the political parties. The Commissions must, in the long run, give effect to national policy which may be achieved without allowing party politics to influence either recruitment or remuneration. The true functions of Public Service Commissions have yet to be determined, but it seems that the policy in N.S.W., for example, is unsound. Here, it is said that some Governments have never officially consulted the Public Service Board upon any matters of staffing, remuneration, organization, accommodation, or general policy, notwithstanding that the Board is charged by statute with these duties. In such circumstances, the Board's recommendations reach Ministers through the channels of employees who are subordinate to the Board, and yet by their contact with Ministers may be able to influence Ministerial decisions against the Board. Mr. Duncan McLachlan, a former Commonwealth Public Service Commissioner, severely denounced this practice, but until we determine the real status of the Public Service Commissions, the selfish ambitions, or the declared hostility of some employees in strategic positions may continue to hamstring Commissions in their efforts to promote economy and efficiency.

Finally, America seems to suffer from the malady of recurring inquiries into the efficiency of public service organization. In Australia, every State has been overhauled during the past ten years. Voluminous reports are written, but the results are quite incommensurate with the expense and the energy involved. If the money so spent were devoted to establishing a research and intelligence staff, or to the training of selected officials, much more would be likely to be achieved. America is well served by a number of voluntary public service institutes, and nearly all the important universities have courses or faculties of public administration. In Australia, there is not in any university a lecturer who devotes his whole time to the science of public administration. It is surely anomalous that in an age when every profession can obtain university or technical training, when even labour has its colleges for training in technique and tactics, the public servants who administer the affairs of the whole State should be left to get their equipment in a fortuitous and haphazard manner.

In a final suggestive chapter on the trends of modern administration, Professor White speculates freely upon the solution of the questions we have raised, and many others. Upon their correct answer depends in no small degree the well-being of every citizen. Administration must be recognized both as an art and a science, "not an inspiration."

F. A. BLAND.

REVIEWS.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By C. J. Webb. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press; 1926.

Professor Webb's work on *Kant's Philosophy of Religion* gives an admirable account of the religious element in Kant's philosophy. It is a very living analysis connecting the work with the man and with the social and political conditions under which he lived. It enables the reader to trace in detail the development in Kant's thought about religion during a mental growth of half a century, whilst a proper stressing of the essential phases in this development helps us to see the whole movement in proper perspective. Kant's great work on "Religion within the limits of mere Reason" receives central consideration. It discusses, but in a more living and detailed way, what Edward Caird has studied in the fourth book of his "Critical Philosophy" under the heading of "The Relation of Christianity to Natural Religion." But though this work is central our author makes it perfectly clear that its main inspiration must be traced to the consciousness of moral obligation which is the vivifying thought of the Second Critique and of all Kant's ethical work. The very conception of God springs from that of the Moral Law (p. 135). God's will cannot be separated from morality, or ascertained otherwise than through our conscience (p. 86). His sole authentic communication to man is through the Practical Reason (p. 171). Briefly, morality is the one thing needful, godliness just a means to virtue (p. 158). Undoubtedly Kant's early pietistic training did much to encourage this fundamentally moral outlook upon the meaning of life—and on p. 20 Prof. Webb excellently summarizes the influence of this training over Kant—but we are not to suppose that this influence could not be, and was not, overruled. There were stages in Kant's growth in which the pure Theoretical Reason was dominant, when a modified form of the ontological argument is brought forward as "the only possible ground of proof for a demonstration of God's existence" (p. 30), and again when Kant, under the influence of Hutcheson, conceives morality as a "feeling" and refers to the champion of the moral sense as "a pioneer in the right treatment of ethical questions" (p. 34). The genuine Kant, however, is the thinker who held that Science and Morality were the two main facts of Pure Reason, that the star-studded heaven and the moral law within were the two main incentives to religious and reverential awe, and that the Moral Law in particular was the supreme and only direct revelation of God to man (p. 194). Chapter VI, on the "*Opus Postumum*" shows that this condition persisted to the end but with a notable modification. In the latest writings of Kant when he was, as it seems, under the influence (indirect) of Spinoza and more alive to the significance of immanentist conceptions, the Moral Law itself came to be regarded as the revelation of a Divine Personality—no longer conceived after the old deistic pattern of pure transcendence—and the consciousness of moral freedom was declared to be "the feeling of the presence of the Godhead in man" (pp. 192, 193). On this point the sixth chapter of the volume under review should be read in conjunction with the admirable Lecture V of Prof. Webb's Gifford Lectures (2nd Series) on "Divine Personality and Human Life." In the deeper intimations of the *Opus Postumum* we have a far securer basis for reflections concerning the existence of God than we have in the so-called moral argument for God's existence which Kant appends to his account of the nature of morality in the Second Critique. The complete good, the *Bonum Consummatum*, demands a virtue that is crowned with happiness, and our moral

consciousness is driven to postulate a power whose essential function it must be to see that virtue shall be suitably rewarded. Prof. Webb points on the one hand to the inconsistency between this postulate and the disinterestedness which Kant holds to be essential to all genuine moral service, and on the other the artificiality of the reasoning which brings in a God to fix an accessory happiness on to virtue, when already the Categorical Imperative holds in itself the authentic revelation of the Unconditioned (p. 66). If we are to accept Kant's own definition of Religion given in the Second Critique itself as "The recognition of all duties as divine commands" (pp. 67, 151), it is clear that if God's existence is postulated at all, it must be as the Being who gives to the Categorical Imperative its ultimate binding force. And this, in the long run, as the posthumous writings clearly bring out, was Kant's own definitive view of the relation between morality and religion.

Kant's central contribution to the religious problem, his "Religion within the limits of mere Reason," emphasizes the primacy and centrality of the moral motive in Religion and deals with the main episodes of religious experience, the sense of original sin (not inherited but implied as a partial depravity in the very nature of moral experience), the hope of recovery through an abrupt inward conversion (which in the sphere of social intercourse shows as gradual reform), and the divine grace which assists and sanctifies the moral effort after a good life. "There is no *getting round* God, as it were, whether by knowledge or by ceremonial" (p. 115). Statutory observances cannot take the place of moral faithfulness (p. 136). Only right conduct can win God's good will.

In a concluding chapter Prof. Webb notes two main deficiencies in Kant's view of Religion: (i) Its profoundly *unhistorical* and *individualistic* character, (ii) its agnostic "*als ob*" attitude when dealing with the relation of religion to reality; in other words, its conviction that the God-concept, though valuable for explanatory purposes, is none the less intrinsically fictive (pp. 208, 210). Prof. Webb's own discussion of the *Opus Postumum* has, however, revealed the strong tendency that set in in Kant's latest phase to stress the personality of God and to interpret our consciousness of morality as the direct witness of God's own presence, and with this conviction the "as if" philosophy loses the grip it possesses for Dr. Hans Vaihinger himself, to whom nothing can be held real that is not directly sense-perceivable. The best criticism of Kant's "*als ob*" tendencies is the development of his own latest thought as revealed in the *Opus Postumum*.

It is the mark of a really stimulating work that by the very clarity and order of its presentation and by its guarded accuracy of expression, it deepens the very problems it discusses and invites the reader to assist in their further solution. Kant's religious philosophy leaves us with many such problems, and Prof. Webb's analysis gives the basis and viewpoint from which they can be further developed. The parts which History and Philosophy must respectively play in the construction of an adequate Theology, the relation of the individual to the social viewpoint in religious experience and the bearing of both on the categories of the personal and the superpersonal, the relation between the fictive and the authentic in the Idea of God, the "very difficult conception" of a propensity to evil (i.e., to the subordinating of duty to inclination) which is original, though not inherited, and not to be identified with mere natural inclination or any mere natural defect (p. 100), the searching query whether duty and happiness may not be shown to be intrinsically connected—e.g., through a revision of Kant's conception of the relation of "end" to "law" as categories of

moral science—these are all living problems which issue inevitably out of the findings of Kant's religious philosophy as set out by Prof. Webb. And there is a further problem to which our author makes special allusion (p. 203). Kant's persistent emphasis on the implicit rationality of Religion is, he maintains, of the greatest value as an offset to the tendency so prevalent at present, and developed at its best in Prof. Rudolf Otto's "Das Heilige," to stress as the essential and characteristic mark of the holy a "numinous" or non-rational element. It is quite easy to be unfair to Prof. Otto here, and our author is very guarded in his phrasing. Let us bear in mind that by "non-rational" Otto does not mean "unknowable." "To know and to understand conceptually," we read, "are two different things" (ch. 16). Moreover, Prof. Otto has made a special attempt to grasp the concept of the irrational more precisely in the fifteenth German edition of his famous work, and any further attempt to develop the problem he raises would have to start from the matter of this latest edition. But even if we do not go beyond John Harvey's English translation entitled "The Idea of the Holy," and published in 1923, we read that "the facts of the Numinous Consciousness point to 'a pure reason' in the profoundest sense, which because of the surpassingness of its content, must be distinguished from both the pure theoretical and the pure practical Reason of Kant, as something yet higher and deeper than they." This ultimate "pure reason," the specifically numinous, is something that in itself is neither true nor good but purely and simply numinous. The point then is that with Otto the specifically religious element cannot be identified with anything so developed as the feeling of awe and sublimity which attends our reverential consciousness of the Moral Law, but with a far more primitive feeling that has no especial reference to morality. Prof. Webb is quite prepared to agree with Otto that Kant was "wrong in identifying the religious with the moral sentiment" (204). Thus the issue turns on the question whether the religious sentiment is to be identified with something aboriginal, and rational, if at all, only in a most primitive sense, or with a "faith" more profoundly and more comprehensively rational than the reason either of science or morality. Otto's main argument favours the former alternative, our author's the latter. And yet it would, I think, be fair for Prof. Webb, judging Prof. Otto out of his own mouth, to claim the author of "Das Heilige" as logically committed to his own position. For if the numinous is "something higher and deeper" than the Reason as Kant conceives it, it cannot surely be anything aboriginal or primitive, but must possess—shall we say?—the rationality characteristic of the Ideal. What else but the source of rationality can be higher and deeper than the Reason? We may then say with Pringle-Pattison ("The Idea of God," ch. 13), that "the presence of the Ideal is the Reality of God within us"; and then, if we are prepared to hold that the Ideal, as the source of all intelligibility whatsoever, is itself rational and intelligible in an eminent degree, we should be prepared to agree that Prof. Otto's conception of the numinous needs a deeper rationalization, and to hold, therefore, with Prof. Webb that "in clearing our minds upon this subject the study of Kant's philosophy of religion may be found of the greatest assistance."

W.R.B.G.

JOURNALS RECEIVED.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES. Edited by S. E. Hooper. Published quarterly for the British Inst. of Phil. Studies, by Macmillan & Co., London. Price 3s. 6d.

Vol. II. No. 5. January, 1927. Spinoza: Professor A. Wolf. Substance: Bertrand Russell. Abstraction and Science: L. S. Stebbing. Social Philosophy of Smith's "Wealth of Nations": Professor John Laird. Prolegomena to the Study of the Black Man's Mind: Professor R. F. Alfred Hoernlé. The Problem of Ethics: Professor P. S. Burrell. Philosophical Survey, etc.

Vol. II. No. 6. April, 1927. The Attempt to Conceive the Absolute: Professor Harold H. Joachim. The Relations of Science and Philosophy: Dorothy Wrinch. The Meanings of "Emergence" and its Modes: Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy. The Philosophical Background of Ethnological Theory: Professor G. Elliot Smith. Some Aspects of the Materialistic Conception of History: Oliver de Selincourt. Social Perfection and Personal Immortality: Professor A. R. Wadia. Freedom: The Editor. Philosophical Survey, Psychological Survey, etc.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. Edited by Professors Woodbridge, Bush and Schneider, Columbia University. Published fortnightly. Price 4 dollars a year.

Vol. XXIV. No. 1. January 6, 1927. Pre-Analytical and Post-Analytical Data: J. Loewenberg. Mechanical Explanation, Its Meaning and Applicability: Y. H. Krikorian. No. 2. January 20. Broad and Hume on Causation and Volition: R. F. A. Hoernlé. Mr. Blake and the Paradox of Zeno: Henry Bradford Smith. No. 3. February 3. "Half-hearted Naturalism": John Dewey. Alfred C. Elsbach's Kant and Einstein: Edgar Wind. No. 4. February 17. The Biotic Centre of Psychology: Percy Hughes. An Instrumental View of the Part-Whole Relation: Morris A. Copeland. No. 5. March 3. Theory and Practice in Psychology: Percy Hughes. A Logical Study of Verbs: Susanne K. Langer. No. 6. March 17. Simplicity versus Adequacy in the Definition of Instinct: C. O. Weber. The Normative in Psychology and Natural Science: Percy Hughes. No. 7. March 31. Categorical Analysis and Pragmatic Realism: Sidney Hook.

PSYCHE. Edited by C. K. Ogden. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., London. Published Quarterly. Price 5s.

No. 27. January, 1927. The New World: Editorial. Lucretius Redivivus, The Hope of a Chemical Psychology: Joseph Needham. Speaking of Resistances: Trigant Burrow. Emergent Evolution and the Social: Professor W. M. Wheeler. Gestalt Psychology in Sport: Dr. H. G. Hartgenbusch. Psychology—Sans Psyche: Professor W. B. Smith. Laughter and the Comic: Richard Hope. Psychic Instability and the Race Question: Norval P. Barksdale. The Diffusion Controversy: Alexander Goldenweiser. Psychology in America: A. A. Roback.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. Official Organ of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. Baillière, Tindall & Cox, London. 30s. per annum.

Vol. VIII. Part 1. January, 1927. Obituary (James Glover). Notes on an Unusual Form of Perversion: James Glover. The Psychological Principles of Infant Analysis: Melanie Klein. Does Masochism Necessarily Imply the Existence of a Death-Instinct?: N. J. Symons. Some Psycho-Analytical Notes on Negation: L. S. Penrose. A Father Pleads for the Death of his Son: M. P. Taylor. The Oral-Erotic Components of Stammering: I. H. Coriat. The Mantle Symbol: Ernest Jones. A Case of Stammering in a Child: M. N. Searl. On Throwing Dishes from a Window in Dreams: N. J. Symons, and other "Shorter Communications," Abstracts, etc.

ARCHIVIO GENERALE DI NEUROLOGIA, PSICHIATRIA E PSICOANALISI. Edited by M. Levi-Bianchini. Official Organ of the Italian Psycho-Analytic Society. Annual subscription outside Italy, 6 dollars. Teramo, Italy.

Vol. VII. No. 4. December, 1926. *Paralysie Générale et Gommès Miliaries*: Prof. C. I. Urechia and Doctor U. Mihalescu. Bibliografie: M. Levi-Bianchini.

VITA E PENSIERO. Edited by F. Agostino Gemelli, O.F.M., Rector of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, and others. Published monthly. Via Sant'Agnese, 4 Milano. Annual subscription (outside Italy) Lire 23, 30.

Vol. XVIII. No. 3. March, 1927. *Le scienze sociali nel pensiero dei cattolici italiani*: Fr. Agostino Gemelli, O.F.M. Il XIV centenario della Badia cassinese: Tommaso Leccisotti. Visioni francescane nella poesia dialettale: Prof. Luigi Sorrento. Il dottore della Provvidenza: Silvio Vismara. Un mito protestante dai piedi di argilla: Doctor Alessandro Fedeli. Leviathan o il dio mortale: Pio Bondioli. Le Vitamine: Prof. Serafino Dezani. Il mese cristiano: Quaresima: Maria Sticco.

PHILOSOPHISCHER WELTANZEIGER, A Supplement to Every Philosophical Periodical. Edited by Paul Feldkeller, Schoenwalde (Niederbarnim) bei Berlin. Annual subscription (6 numbers), Mk. 1.40.

(This supplement, now appearing for the first time, aims at a sort of pooling of the current philosophical interests of all the nations, and this with as little delay as possible.)

WELFARE WORK. Journal of the Institute of Industrial Welfare. Published monthly. London. 5s. per annum.

THE MEDICAL JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA. Sydney. Published weekly. Price 1s.

The following notice has been received:

The publisher of the *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy* is Longmans, Green & Co., 55 Fifth Avenue, New York City, and 39 Paternoster Road, London. The price of the volume in paper covers is \$5.00; in cloth binding \$6.00. Every active member will receive a copy without cost as soon as the book is off the press. Associate members are entitled to purchase one copy at the special price of \$3.00. It is planned to publish the book in the late spring of 1927. Orders should be sent to the publisher, at New York or London, and not to the Editor of the *Proceedings*. It is requested that orders be sent in advance as far as possible to facilitate an accurate estimate of the edition needed.

EDGAR S. BRIGHTMAN, Editor.

NOTES AND NEWS.

It is with great regret that we have to record the death last month in Paris of Mrs. Anderson, wife of Emeritus Professor Francis Anderson, the first editor of this Journal.

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Professors John Anderson and William S. Dawson, whose appointments to the Chairs of Philosophy and Psychiatry respectively we chronicled in the March number, duly arrived in Sydney and entered upon their duties at the beginning of the term.

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The Annual Meeting of the Wellington Local Branch of the A.A.P.P. was held at Victoria University College on May 2. There was an excellent attendance of members and visitors. The annual report showed that there were 49 members of the local branch during 1926 and this number has already been added to. The following officers

were elected. President: Sir Robert Stout, P.C.; Vice-Presidents: Dr. Ada Paterson, Rev. D. J. Gibb, P. Fraser, Esq., M.P., Professor T. A. Hunter, W. H. Gould, Esq., M.A.; Hon. Secretary: Dr. I. L. G. Sutherland; Hon. Treasurer: E. Beaglehole, Esq.; Committee: Dr. Helen Bakewell, Misses F. Roberts and O. M. Sheppard, M.A., and Messrs. C. A. Batt and D. J. Donald. After the business there was a symposium on the Mental Hygiene of Childhood, papers being read by Dr. Helen Bakewell, Miss W. A. Valentine and Dr. I. L. G. Sutherland. A keen discussion followed.

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Mr. E. Ronald Walker and Mr. W. J. Weeden, who graduated in March with First Class Honours in Psychology, have received appointments at the University of Sydney. Mr. Walker has been appointed to a lectureship in Economics, Mr. Weeden to a Science Research Scholarship.

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The Fifth Annual General Meeting of the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy was held at the University of Sydney on May 19, 20 and 21. The programme was as follows:

First Session.—Thursday, May 19, 7.30 p.m. in the Column Room: (1) Presidential Address by the Retiring President, Professor T. Hunter, M.A., M.Sc. (Professor of Philosophy and Mental Science, Victoria University College, Wellington, N.Z.). *Some Concepts in Relation to Social Science*. (2) *Empiricism*, by Professor John Anderson, M.A. (Challis Professor of Philosophy, University of Sydney). *Chairman*: Professor Lovell, M.A., Ph.D.

Second Session.—Friday, May 20, 7.15 p.m., in the Column Room: (1) Annual Reports of the Hon. Secretary and Hon. Treasurer. (2) Address: *Personality*, by Professor Dawson, B.A., M.B., Ch.M., M.D. (Oxon.), (Professor of Psychiatry, Medical School, Sydney University). (3) *Mental Tests and Delinquency*, by Mr. A. J. Gray, B.A., (Lecturer in Psychology, Teachers' College, Sydney). *Chairman*: Professor Hunter, M.A., M.Sc.

Third Session: Saturday, May 21, 2.45 p.m., in the Inorganic Chemistry Theatre: (1) *The Evolution of Primitive Man*, by Professor L. Harrison, B.A., B.Sc. (Professor of Zoology, University of Sydney). (2) *The Sociology of Primitive Man*, by Professor Radcliffe Browne, M.A. (Professor of Anthropology, University of Sydney). (3) *The Migrations of Primitive Man*, by Professor Griffith Taylor, D.Sc., B.E., B.A., F.R.G.S. (McCaughy Associate Professor of Geography, University of Sydney). *Chairman*: Professor Mackie, M.A.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

SELECTIONS FROM ENGLISH DRAMATISTS. By Geoffrey H. Crump. Published by George G. Harrap, London. Price 2s. 6d.

DAYS BEFORE HISTORY (New Edition). By H. R. Hall. Published by George G. Harrap, London. Price 1s. 6d.

REST PAUSES IN HEAVY AND MODERATELY HEAVY INDUSTRIAL WORK. By H. M. Vernon and T. Bedford. Report No. 41 of the Industrial Fatigue Research Board, London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1927. Price 9d.

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